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ABSTRACT 
 
The ever increasing regional and global trade competition has manifested itself in a growing 
number of non-standard forms of employment including the increasing use of "temporary 
employment services" (or “labour brokers” as commonly referred to). Labour brokers enter 
into employment relationships as third parties with client companies to supply employees 
through a commercial contract. These labour services usually fall outside the regular two-
party contract of employment defined under existing labour laws and thus the employees are 
not covered by that law.  Labour brokers have been labelled as “the re-emergence of new 
apartheid strategy” and “modern slavery” by some quarters in labour sectors of Namibia and 
South Africa. Trade unions, particularly, have led the most vocal resistance against labour 
brokers in both countries. They argue that, like previous apartheid contract labour systems, 
labour brokers today erode standards for decent working conditions and weaken union 
representations in the workplace. Thus unions have repeatedly sent strong calls to 
lawmakers to amend existing labour laws and „forever put labour broking in its grave where it 
belong‟1. On the other hand, employers have argued that recent forces of globalisation 
demand flexible employment strategies and banning labour brokers will make it more difficult 
for local businesses compete profitably globally via flexible short term employments and can 
lead to losses of many job opportunities.2   
It is against this background that I will argue that current labour laws should be amended to 
define and regulate labour brokers more closely and compel them to recognise workers 
rights and conditions as equal as those of standard employees. But first, I will highlight some 
socio-economic indicators influencing the labour markets in South Africa and Namibia, 
including the history of worker‟s rights under the contract labour systems in both countries. 
Second, I will look at some of the expressed exploitive conditions resulting from the use of 
labour brokers and also look at some reasons why businesses engage labour brokers. 
Thereafter I will point out some of the reasons why trade unions have called for a total ban 
on labour brokers. I will then discuss the difficulty of banning labour brokers, including the 
constitutional challenge in the landmark case of African Personnel Services v Government of 
the Republic of Namibia3. Lastly i will expand on the ruling by the Namibian Supreme Court 
of Appeal (NSA) recommending a regulatory approach in line with the International Labour 
Organisation‟s (ILO) conventions on third-party employments. 
                                                          
1
 Evilastus Kaaronda, Secretary General-National Union for Namibian Workers (NUNW) in The Namibian 5 May 2010 available 
at http://www.namibian.com.na (accessed on 18 April 2011) 
2
 „..Present proposals [amendments to ban labour brokers] are more negative than positive on job creation and could jeopardise 
the jobs of an estimated 850 000 employees who work in this system. It is essential that a healthy balance is found between 
the protection of workers and job security.‟ Johan Kruger, Head - Solidarity Research Institute ,19 January 2011 available at 
http://www.sabinet.co.za (accessed on 15 July 2011) 
3
 African Personnel Services v Government of the Republic of Namibia [2009] NSA 17 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
1.1 Problem Statement 
 
Ever since labour brokers emerged in South Africa and Namibia, many concerns of workers‟ 
rights violations have been raised. Those who argue against labour brokers allege that 
brokers are involved in a direct modern day form of slavery. 1 It is argued that like slavery, 
brokers hire out employees to third parties and thereafter collect a price/fee from the client 
for the labour provided by the workers. The broker then deducts a large percentage fee and 
pays the workers a basic salary often without providing other employment benefits. These 
workers are regularly excluded from pension benefits, medical coverage and workmen‟s 
compensation for injuries on duty or terminations.2 It is with this in mind that over the past 
few years‟ lawmakers in South Africa and Namibia, under severe pressure from trade union 
movements, have contemplated amending existing labour laws to ban the practice of labour 
brokers in the labour market. However, article 21 (j) of the Namibian Constitution and section 
22 of the South African Constitution respectively, gives both natural and juristic persons 
including labour brokers the „right to choose trade, occupation and profession freely‟3. Thus it 
has become virtually impossible to outlaw labour broking as a form of business trade as it 
infringes the right of labour company as was ruled in the Namibian Supreme Court of Appeal 
(SCA) case between African Personnel Services v Government of the Republic of Namibia.4 
However, section 22 of the constitution in South Africa adds that „laws can be passed to 
regulate how people practice their trade, occupation or professions’.  Thus strong regulation 
has emerged as the best form of legislative direction that best reconciles the interest of 
employers for flexible employment options with the rights of workers for better protection in 
labour broking jobs.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
1
 Judge Parker C of the High Court of Namibia concluded that labour hire „smacks of the hiring of a slave by his slave-master to 
another person by reducing human beings as “private property" „, in African Personnel Services & others v Government of the 
Republic of Namibia [2007] NAHC. 
2
  A report by Labour Resource and Research Institute (LaRRI) in Namibia, highlighted that „although the provisions of 
Namibian labour law apply to labour broking companies as well, the practice of employment at will is applied by labour 
brokers; labour broking is hardly a springboard for permanent jobs; and the most significant problems experienced by labour 
broking workers are the lack of benefits and job security and low wages.‟  The debate was preceded by LaRRI available at 
www.larri.com.na (accessed on 16 April 2011). 
3
 Article 21(j) of the Namibian Constitution, No. 02 of 1996 and Section 22 of the South African Constitution. 
4
 African Personnel Services v Government of the Republic of Namibia [2009] NSA 17. 
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1.2 Research Question 
 
Law is a field of study that is dynamic and continuously evolves to regulate and address the 
developments in society. In Namibia and South African, the legislative assemblies in both 
countries have constantly reviewed laws and policies, since the dawn of democracy,  to safe 
guard the rights of citizens better and also create economic environments that promote 
business growth and competitiveness.  This mini-thesis, specifically, investigates the 
research question on how labour laws can succeed in reconciling the rights and interests of 
labour broker employees and employers in South African and Namibia. Unions and labour 
broking employees have expressed that many of their rights are not recognised by activities 
of labour brokers under existing labour laws thus labour brokers should not be allowed to 
exist as employers, while on the other hand businesses have complained that existing labour 
laws are too rigid and must show more flexibility to allow employers to work with modern 
forms of flexible employment strategies such as labour broking to stay competitive in a 
globalised modern business world. Thus instead of the law completely getting rid of labour 
brokers and taking away the interests of employers to maintain competitiveness as sought 
by the various stakeholders in this debate, this mini-thesis investigates how labour law can 
succeed to reconcile the two positions without diminishing the others rights or interests.  
 
 
1.3 Aim/s of the Research   
This mini-thesis aims to guide the ongoing national labour debates in South Africa and 
Namibia, that existing labour laws should be amended to outlaw labour brokers for creating 
exploitive conditions of employment. Trade unions in both South Africa and Namibia have 
advocated for a total ban on labour broking operations, while businesses have argued 
against such drastic action. The employers have expressed the view that banning labour 
broking will lead to many job losses and increase unemployment figures as the sector 
creates more employment opportunities in the labour markets.5 
The mini-thesis thus aims to provide concrete recommendations to lawmakers that rather 
than unconstitutionally banning labour broking, lawmakers should try to amend existing 
labour laws to regulate labour brokers in a framework that compels them to adhere to basic 
employment conditions. A strong regulation will ensure full protection of worker rights for 
                                               
5
 „..Present proposals [amendments to ban labour brokers] are more negative than positive on job creation and could 
jeopardise the jobs of an estimated 850 000 employees who work in this system. It is essential that a healthy balance is found 
between the protection of workers and job security.‟ Johan Kruger, Head - Solidarity Research Institute ,19 January 2011 
available at http://www.sabinet.co.za (accessed on 15 July 2011). 
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decent work without diminishing the business sector‟s need for flexible employment 
strategies such as short-term employment contracts.  
 
1.4 Rationale of  the Study  
 
It is not a secret that the 20th century context of globalisation, such as flexible employment 
structures, has presented the world of work with both promises and problems.  In developing 
economies such as South Africa and Namibia, globalisation has made the pursuit of the 
development agenda while maintaining internal and external stability a difficult and delicate 
task. On the one hand, „globalisation holds out to participants the promise of growth in trade 
and international investment, on the other hand it heightens the risks of instability and 
marginalisation‟6, especially the protection of worker‟s rights employed under the recent 
flexible non-standard forms of employment, such as labour broking. Thus, the mini-thesis 
aims to highlight lessons that both South Africa and Namibia can share on the measures 
undertaken to regulate or outlaw labour brokers to date. Both countries have fairly new 
labour laws that were adopted to foster better social justice for all after years of oppressed 
worker‟s rights and exploitive conditions to the majority. In recent times these laws have 
come up against the forces of globalisation in a situation that has threatened to hold back 
both the level of national economic growth and social justice achievements. 
  
1.5 Research Hypothesis 
 
Although trade unions in South Africa and Namibia have made persistent and militant calls 
for the respective government to amend existing labour laws and „forever put labour broking 
to its grave where it belong‟ 7, in contrast to the opposing view expressed by employers for 
„more flexibility in the legislation of the labour market‟8, this mini- thesis will argue that a 
regulatory approach can succeed in finding a balance between the interests of employers for 
greater flexibility and the workers‟ rights to achieve better protection in their employment 
conditions.  
 
 
 
                                               
6 According to Barker (2003) in A new agenda for being human … again … in the world of work available at 
   http://www.mywage.com/main/  (accessed on 5 April 2011).  
7
 Evilastus Kaaronda, Secretary General-National Union for Namibian Workers (NUNW), in The Namibian 5 May 2010 available 
at http://www.namibian.com.na (accessed on 18 April 2011). 
8
 „Total prohibition of labour brokers did not address the situation in a satisfactory way. The question needs to be asked why 
labour brokers became part of certain labour market dispensations. The main reasons are the over-regulation and inflexibility 
of the labour market, obliging employers to make use of alternative methods of staffing their businesses in order to remain 
competitive..‟ said Tim Parkhouse, Secretary General- Namibia Employers Federation (NEF), in The Namibian, 6 July 2007 
available at http://www.namibian.com.na (accessed on 21 April 2011). 
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1.6 Scope/Limitation of the Research  
 
The mini-thesis will be restricted to the development of labour brokers in South Africa and 
Namibia as new democracies that emerged from the same exploitive apartheid systems in 
respect of seeking decent employment conditions and rights for all citizens irrespective of 
their social class. It will particularly focus on the scope of those labour laws that came into 
existence after the independence of both countries in the early 1990s. These labour laws 
were greatly expected to provide better social justice in labour conditions to both unskilled 
and semi-skilled workers. However many shortcomings have been exposed in those recent 
labour laws of both countries by the pressures of globalisation such as the usage of non-
standard forms of employment. One of the forms of employment that has proved to be a 
challenge to existing labour laws is labour broking. Thus this mini-thesis will also discuss 
some lessons that both South Africa and Namibia can share and learn from each other on 
the challenges and measures undertaken to control labour broking employment, such as 
those highlighted in the labour broking case of African Personnel Services v GRN.9  In 
addition special recognition will be given to the „decent work‟10 definition of the body that 
oversees world labour standards, the International Labour Organisation (ILO), to which both 
South Africa11 and Namibia12 are affiliated. 
 
 
1.7 Significance of the Research 
 
Although labour laws differ from country to country, a comparative analysis on the impact of 
labour brokers on the rights of workers in the two countries being discussed is significant 
because being young democracies, South Africa and Namibia emerged at the height of 
world globalisation with relatively new labour laws. Initially these statutes primarily sought to 
ensure fair workers rights and conditions that were often denied to the majority of the 
citizens in the pre-democracy labour markets.  However, the effects of globalisation have put 
heavy strains on the original scope of those labour statutes especially around the initial 
                                               
9
  African Personnel Services v Government of the Republic of Namibia [2009] NASC 17. 
10
 The four pillars of decent work, according to the ILO, are employment opportunities, workers' rights, social protection and 
representation.  
11
 South Africa is a member of the International Labour Organisation (ILO) and the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 
directs that international law "must", and foreign law "may" be considered when the Bill of Rights is interpreted. Section 39 of 
the Constitution of South Africa. 
12
 Namibia is also member of the ILO and under the heading "Principles of State Policy", the Namibian Constitution provides 
that the state must adopt policies aimed at "adherence to and action in accordance with the international Conventions and 
Recommendations of the ILO". Although it is a member, Namibia is not a signatory to the ILO's Private Employment Agencies 
Convention, which seeks to provide guidelines in respect of labour broking.  
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definition of the parties to a contract of employment. That definition only recognised 
employment that exists between two parties, an employer and an employee, leaving out the 
new globalisation phenomenon of third parties such as labour brokers uncontrolled. The 
situation created a vacuum for extreme exploitation of workers basic conditions of 
employment and benefits by certain businesses, on the notion of fostering competiveness. 13   
Thus the mini-thesis is of great significance to outline that amendments are needed in the 
current labour laws to ensure sound regulatory approaches that guarantee every worker in 
South Africa and Namibia with full employment rights.  Under a regulatory approach, 
employers have room to keep up with global competitive flexible employment strategies 
while ensuring decent work for workers. In the on-going debate whether to ban labour 
brokers or not, this mini-thesis aims to educate workers and unions in South Africa and 
Namibia that in the current context of high unemployment and a very high unskilled labour 
force, sound regulations of labour broking enterprises in labour law can actually help protect 
their rights and basic conditions of employment in this industry rather than completly 
diminishing these chances of employment. 
 
1.8 Research Methodology 
 
This research is conducted by reviewing the literature published in secondary sources that 
include articles in journals, academic books, newspapers, and web publications as well as 
those from primary sources, such as, policies, laws, international conventions and original 
narratives by independent researchers, academic scholars, labour think tanks, unions and 
employer federations on the effects of labour brokers on workers‟ rights and employers need 
for flexible labour. The mini-thesis will attempt to paint a picture on the development of 
labour broking in South Africa and Namibia, after it has constructed a narrative review on the 
history of labour rights in both counties, and then it will end by developing arguments based 
on an analysis of existing labour laws versus the operations of labour brokers. In addition it 
will highlight recent court judgments on controlling labour brokers, as well as analyse the 
relevant international conventions on non-standards forms of employment. 
 
1.9 Chapter Outline  
 
Chapter ONE gives the background to the research of the thesis. It outlines the aim and 
rationale of the research. The chapter clarifies why the research question was set topic. This 
chapter also provides a problem statement and a hypothesis for the research topic. Lastly, 
                                               
13
 “..regulation of Labour in South Africa presents a tool for ensuring competitiveness between firms by setting the terms on 
which they compete with each other  thereby avoid a „race to the bottom‟.  It prevents employers using certain practices that 
amount to destructive competition-i.e. low wages or lack of safety as a basis for competing with other employers. It therefore 
forces employers who wish to remain competitive to direct their efforts to effective utilisation of human resources, innovation 
and the search for new markets.” Sengenberger, 1994, in Benjamin P. Labour Market Regulation: International and South 
African Perspectives (2005) 6. 
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the chapter addresses the area to which the topic will be limited and the methodologies used 
to source information about the topic. 
 
Chapter TWO briefly describes the economies in the Republic of South Africa and the 
Republic of Namibia, including, national income levels and annual GDP as well as prevailing 
socio-demographics, such as, population sizes, literacy levels, and life expectancy and 
unemployment levels to highlight the various factors that drive and encourage people to 
seek employment under less favourable conditions provided by unregulated labour brokers. 
Thereafter this chapter gives an overview of the history of workers‟ rights and the 
development of current labour laws in the two countries as they set out to protect workers 
from post-democracy exploitative and unfavourable working conditions subjected to the 
majority of the populations.   
 
Chapter THREE discusses the development of labour brokers in South Africa and Namibia. 
The chapter will also look at the definitions of an employee and the status of labour brokers 
in the current legislations of South African and Namibia. It then looks at the position and 
conventions of the International Labour Organisation (ILO) on third party employments such 
a labour brokers. Thereafter it will discuss the difference between labour brokers, 
independent contractors and placement agencies. Lastly this chapter it will highlight some 
reasons why modern companies engage the services of labour brokering services.  
 
Chapter FOUR will highlight some of the expressed exploitive conditions resulting from the 
employment under labour brokers that are protected in standard employment relationships. 
More specifically the chapter looks at the level of job security and tenure of employment of 
workers employed by labour brokers. In addition, in this chapter, the extent to which the 
retrenchment and contract termination practices of labour broking companies adhere to 
existing South African and Namibian labour Acts, will be discussed.  
 
Chapter FIVE discusses the position of trade unions on labour brokers, specifically their 
difficulty to organise and categorise the employees under such enterprises. The chapter will 
also highlights the current levels of union representation for labour broker employees and 
the ongoing debate whether or not to organise them.  
 
Chapter SIX looks at the previous steps to totally outlaw activities of labour brokers. The 
chapter will especially discuss the position of the courts in the African Personnel Services v 
GRN14 case in Namibia. This chapter outlines the proposed amendments to existing labour 
laws to effectively regulate the operation of labour brokers.  
 
                                               
14
 African Personnel Services v Government of the Republic of Namibia [2009] NASC 17. 
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Chapter SEVEN draws conclusions from all the content covered by the thesis and makes 
recommendations to develop labour laws that protect workers‟ rights without diminishing the 
labour broker clients‟ need for flexibility.  
 
 
CHAPTER 2 
 
LABOUR MARKETS IN SOUTH AFRICA AND NAMIBIA 
  
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter traces the socio-development factors and the history of workers‟ rights in the 
labour markets of South Africa and Namibia. This is done primarily in order to give a 
background on how current labour laws have fallen short in recent times in providing strong 
protection levels to all employees, as was envisaged in moving away from the apartheid 
labour era. The initial laws founded under the beacon of democratisation were set out to 
successfully transform the old exploitive labour markets and ensure economic improvement 
of all citizens. However they have seen little progress to ensure decent employment 
conditions and living standards due to amongst others the ever increasing unemployment 
rates far outweighing the new jobs created annually in the labour markets of both countries 
as result of slow economic growths. Because of the high levels of unemployment prevailing 
throughout South Africa and Namibia, the practices of non-standard employment such as 
labour broking have fed of those figures of desperation. As the populations grow rapidly, 
and more and more poorly literate and less skilled citizens will become desperate for 
employment opportunities under any form. 15 Thus it might be crucial that sound regulations 
in both countries are passed and implemented to ensure that the activities of labour brokers 
are effectively registered and regulated so that people do not sink further into poverty as a 
result of exploitation. Despite being blessed with an abundance of natural resources and 
minerals, it seems the economies of both South Africa and Namibia have failed to grow 
since democratisation at a GDP rate that has created new meaningful and decent jobs 
under the new globalisation market forces.  Thus innovative approaches in regulation might 
have to be developed and adopted if labour markets are too keep the limited non-standard 
jobs being created by labour brokers especially in countries where there are minimal 
employment opportunities for those who are less educated and unskilled citizens.   
 
 
 
                                               
15
 Jauch H Trade Unions in Namibia (2004) 7 concludes that „features of those colonial legacies are still visible today as 
Namibia is characterised by huge socio-economic inequalities that are largely a reflection  of its colonial apartheid history, but 
also of the class stratification that has taken place since independence‟. 
 
 
 
 
8 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2.2 South Africa 
 
2.2.1 Population 
 
Since South Africa's first democratic election in 1994, there have been three official 
censuses. The first was in 1996, the second followed in 2001, while the third took place in 
October 2011. Initially the population stood at 40.6-million in 1996 and increased to 44.8-
million in 2001. But from 2001 to 2011, the population grew by an additional 15.5 per cent 
according to the national census 2011 results released by Statistics South Africa 16  in 
October 2012.17 Thus, according to the official results from the last national census the 
country's population stood at around 51.7 million in October 2011. This rapid population 
growth of around 11million people from the first national census in 1996 to the last one in 
2011 has far out grown the job creation rate in the South African labour market. As a result 
more and more people are constantly hunting for an opportunity to be employed out of 
desperation even under conditions that are less favourable such as labour brokers. 
 
2.2.2 Education Levels 
 
Education in a country goes in correlation with employability of the population as it 
determines the quality and type of human resources the country has in terms of skills and 
knowledge. It refers particularly to the skills and knowledge acquired through an established 
schooling system that improves the chances of employability of the population.  The biggest 
challenge facing the post-apartheid South Africa is the upliftment and improvement of its 
skills base through education and training to meet the demand in the ever dynamic labour 
market. This is particularly challenging following years of discriminatory and unequal parallel 
education systems that prevailed in the country for many years before 1994. A study 
conducted by Market Research Africa and the SABC in 1994 showed that while 88 per cent 
of white learners had access to dictionaries, 65 per cent to encyclopaedias, 90 per cent to 
their own room, 71 per cent to their own desk, 68 per cent to their own reading light, 33 per 
cent to a personal computer, and 93 per cent to television, comparative figures for black 
learners were that 43 per cent had access to dictionaries, and 2 per cent to encyclopaedias, 
15 per cent had their own rooms, 3 per cent their own desk, and 5 per cent their own reading 
light, 0 per cent a personal computer and about 69 per cent access to a television. The gaps 
                                               
16
 The national body that gathers statistics on all matters related to the country under the Statistics Act of 1999. 
17
According to South Africa info available at http://www.southafrica.info/about/people/census-301012a.htm  (accessed on  20 
    April 2013) 
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between these figures have slightly reduced over the past 18 years of democracy; however, 
there still exists a huge population group with very little or no education in South Africa thus 
making them difficult to employ and vulnerable for labour exploitation. These groups form the 
majority of the employees usually employed under the recent phenomenon of labour brokers 
as they are often very desperate and willing to accept any kinds of conditions put for 
employment. With their low levels of education and limited understanding of labour law 
provisions, not only are they extremely vulnerable in the employment power equilibrium but 
many labour brokers go as far as exploiting their labour rights continuously. 
 
2.2.3 Unemployment  Rate 
 
One of the main factors that have continued to drive labour brokers and their operations to 
grow is that South Africa has a large population of unemployed desperate job seekers. 
These are mainly people from the previously disadvantaged population groups who as 
highlighted above have had very little education to date. Because of their perceived level of 
unemployability, they often find it extremely difficult to secure job opportunities in the labour 
markets. That is when some labour brokers would come along with promises of job 
opportunities that often are below the International Labour Organisation (ILO) standards of 
decent work. 
 
According to figures from the last quarter reports of 2012 produced by Statistics South 
Africa, unemployment figures in the country stood at 25 percent. 18  South Africa 
unemployment rate statistics are defined in terms of what is referred to by Stats- SA as the 
strict definition. This „strict‟ definition of unemployment excludes from the ranks of the 
unemployed those individuals (15-65 years old) who are without jobs and available for work, 
but who are not actively seeking work. However, Barker expresses concern about this 
definition. He points out that the shortcoming of this definition is that the criterion only 
considers those who „have taken active steps to look for work and excludes those that have 
lost hope to look for work even though they might desperately need a job‟.19 
  
The ILO has provided for this problem by indicating that the standard definition of 
unemployment can be applied by relaxing the criterion of seeking work. It states that 
„unemployed workers are those who are currently not working but are willing and able to 
work for pay, currently available to work, and have actively searched for work‟. However, the 
ILO mentions that other appropriate tests to suit national circumstances can be developed.20 
                                               
18
 Statistics available at http://www.statssa.gov.za/default.asp (accessed on 20 April 2013). 
19
 Barker F The South African Labour Market: Theory and Practise 5 ed (2007) 208 
20
 International Labour Organisation (ILO) amended draft resolution concerning statistics of the economically active population, 
employment, unemployment and underemployment (1982). See also 
http://www.ilo.org/public/english/bureau/stat/res/index.htm (accessed on 21 November 2011). 
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2.2.4 Economic Index 
 
Some of the highlighted reasons that drive scores of people to seek employment below 
decent work levels with labour brokers have been the dissatisfactory economic growth 
levels and new employment creation rates in the job markets. The recent economic 
performance in South Africa has been below the projected rate that will enable the markets 
to create a number of new job opportunities to maintain a correlation with the rapid 
population growth numbers.  
 
Although South Africa has the largest economy in Africa, accounts for 24 per cent of the 
continents Gross Domestic Product (GDP), and is ranked as an upper-middle income 
economy by the World Bank the majority of the population finds it tough to find a decent 
job.21 For many years, mining has been the main driving force behind the development of 
Africa's most advanced and richest economy. Although diamond and gold production may 
now be well down from their peaks in recent years, South Africa still remains the world‟s 
second largest producer of gold.  In addition, it is the world's largest producer of chrome, 
manganese, platinum, vanadium and vermiculite, the second largest producer of ilmenite, 
palladium, rutile and zirconium, while it is also the world's third largest coal exporter.22  
 
However the country is ranked in the top 10 countries in the world for income inequality.23 
The demise of apartheid in 1994 left a skewed racial economic hierarchy that placed whites 
firmly at the top, followed by Indians, coloureds, and then blacks.24 Thus all these natural 
resources have failed to reach the majority of the population as many are still living in abject 
poverty due to lack of employment or if they do find employment than they poor working 
conditions and are lowly paid. Barker adds that „had the country‟s economic growth been 
higher then the annual average of 2.7 per cent experienced since the transition to full 
democracy, the country would probably have been able to create more jobs‟ .25 
 
 
 
                                               
21
  The World Bank Working for a world free of poverty available on http://data.worldbank.org/country/south-africa#cp_wdi 
(accessed 20 April 2013). 
22
  According to Economy of South Africa  available at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Economy_of_South_Africa ( accessed on 23 
November 2011) 
23
 „South Africa has highest gap between rich and poor‟, The Business Report', 28 September 2009, available on Busrep.co.za. 
(accessed on 23 November 2011). 
24
 According to The Marxism South African 2011 local government elections: what is in it for the working class available on 
     http://www.marxist.com/south-african-2011-local-government-elections.htm  (accessed on  20 April 2013) 
25
 Barker F The South African Labour Market: Theory and Practise 5 ed (2007) 47. 
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2.2.5 History and Development of the South African Labour Laws 
 
The history of labour in South Africa can be as far traced back as 1652 when the first settlers 
arrived at the Cape. According to Finnemore, even at that early stage „the need for labour 
was already a pressing issue‟. He writes that 
 
„not only was the indigenous population subordinated directly in the [global] slave-
trade. But by the end of the eighteenth century slavery had become an integral part 
of the Cape Colony of South Africa.  The nomadic Boer farmers carried these ideas 
in to the interior, where blacks were expected to do manual labour. They rendered 
their services to the farmers in return for squatting rights.‟26   
At this time, the employment relationship was regarded as being one of master and servant. 
The relationship between employers and their domestic or farm a worker was governed by 
various Acts, including the master and servants Act 15 of 1856.  
However, the most dramatic impact on South African labour history occurred around 1897 
with the discovery of diamonds and gold. During this time, mining entrepreneurs looking to 
fully tap into the new found riches of the country were limited by the lack of a ready source of 
skilled and unskilled labour to draw on. Thus they turned to European and even Australian 
labour markets to attract employees. Subsequently many skilled white workers began 
careers in elite positions and the first trade union founded in 1881, known as the Carpenters 
and Joiners Union was primarily formed to protect this status of the white “elite” in major 
mine jobs. 
But while skilled labour for mines could be provided by overseas recruitment, there was no 
pool of unskilled labour available to draw on. At the time, the majority of the black citizens 
were still successfully subsisting off the land and not many were willing to go to the mines.27  
However, Finnemore writes that after white settlers started to forcefully deprive the 
indigenous populations of their land they were forced to look for work on the mines to earn 
money.  
                                               
26
 Finnemore M Introduction to Labour Relations is South Africa 5ed (1997) 21. 
27
 Finnemore M (1997) 22. 
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The mining industry would continue to grow with an increase in the shortage of cheap 
labour; however, many black workers showed a disinterest in taking up further mine jobs due 
to the poor work conditions. Bhoola adds that „the difference in political power between 
whites and blacks became entrenched as trade unions, catering largely for white workers, 
were bargaining increasingly on the basis of race‟28 at the time. In 1911, the Native Labour 
Regulation Act was passed making it a crime for blacks to leave their jobs, and strikes were 
prohibited. In 1913 the Land Act was passed to finally force black peasants off their land.29  
Eventually these two laws would compel blacks to concentrate on looking for jobs as cheap 
labour in specific districts through what was known as the migratory labour system. In terms 
of this system, black workers were forced to take any job offered as the pass law only 
permitted them a few days in which to find work in the allocated area. 
 The control of the black labour force was ultimately secured by the discriminatory legislation 
and radical government support for white mine owners. Blacks had no political voice in all 
spheres of the booming South Africa mining industry, or in upper class society.  This lack of 
political rights led to the formation of the South African Native National Congress (the 
forerunner of the present day African National Congress) in 1912.  The organisation 
protested against the new Constitution which failed to extend voting rights to the black 
population. It also rejected the provisions of the Mines and Works Act which provided a 
colour bar for jobs on the mines.   
 According to Finnemore, at that time black workers still did not organise trade unions on the 
mines. He points out, first, that they were isolated from one another by the compound 
system, secondly, that they received no support from white workers who could have shared 
their union expertise with them and lastly, that tribal allegiances were still strong amongst the 
indigenous groups.30  
However, the interest of black workers in unions outside the mines was indicated by the 
development in 1919 of the Industrial and Commercial Workers Union (ICU). The union had 
broad issues of concern to the black population, ranging from land evictions to low wages 
and raids on beer brewing establishments operated largely by black women who had moved 
to urban areas with their husbands. The ICU took up many issues in the courts and was 
generally seen as a vociferous fighter for black workers‟ rights and the dignity of black 
persons. But due to internal differences, divisions in leadership, lack of democratic structures 
and other external pressures, the union collapsed by the early 1930s. 
                                               
28
 Bhoola U Labour Law in South Africa (2010) available at http://www.jobs-south-africa.com/labour-law.html   (accessed on 09 
January 2012). 
29
 In terms of the Act only about ten per cent of the South African land would be reserved for black ownership. Black farmers 
were also prohibited from renting any land from white farmers. Thus shortages of land and overcrowding forced many of 
these black farmers to look for work in urban areas and the migratory labour system was consequently established.  
30
 Finnemore M Introduction to Labour Relations is South Africa 5ed (1997) 26. 
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Nevertheless the greatest attention to labour relation concerns of the black workers was 
manifested after the 1922 Rand Rebellion.   Following this general strike, which Bhoola 
referred to as „one of the watershed moments in South African labour history‟, the 
government at the time passed the Industrial Conciliation Act in 1924.31 This Act was the 
direct forefather of the Industrial Conciliation Act of 1956, which was later, renamed the 
Labour Relations Act of 1956. In terms of this Act of 1956, trade unions representing white 
workers were accorded recognition; while a separate system for Black workers was created.  
In 1948 the National Party came into power, which saw the birth of Afrikaner nationalism. In 
1950 the Suppression of Communism Act was passed, which led to the large-scale 
repression of union activists. The 1950s was a turbulent time in the political history of South 
Africa. This turbulence led to the amendment of the 1956 Industrial Conciliation Act in order 
to ensure tougher controls over black workers. 
 
In 1979 a Commission of Inquiry, the Wiehahn Commission was set up to investigate the 
labour situation in South Africa. In its subsequent Report the Wiehahn Commission made 
recommendations that were to forever change the face of labour law in South Africa. 
Amongst the most significant recommendations that were made was to extend freedom of 
association to all persons, irrespective of race or sex. The result was that trade unions 
representing black workers were now able to make use of the machinery of the Labour 
Relations Act of 1956.    
 
During the early 1980s the power struggle in South Africa reached new heights. The 
government became further entrapped in attempting to defend its interests and policies 
against what it termed the „total onslaught‟, led by the African National Congress (ANC) and 
the South African Communist Party (SACP). In 1985, the Congress of South African Trade 
Unions (COSATU) was formed from a large number of independent unions and various 
former union bodies that disbanded due to both lack of the will for political involvement and 
growing pressures on their membership, and it became the biggest union umbrella body.32  
From the outset, COSATU identified itself with the political problems which affected its 
member‟s daily lives and thus developed a strong relationship with the underground ANC 
leadership, which was still banned at the time. 
 
Despite the high political turmoil of the 1980s, at most times the statutory systems and 
regulations frameworks were used to express grievances. Amongst the significant 
                                               
31
 The machinery for state control over industrial relations was further extended with the enactment of the Wage Act in 1925. 
The Act provided for the unilateral determination of wages and working conditions by the State where there was no 
agreement under the Industrial Conciliation Act. The Wage Act applied to black workers and a few black trade unions were 
able to gain some benefits for members by using the Wage Act to their advantage. 
32
 At its inception COSATU had a total membership of 450 000.  
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developments of this period was the transformation of the Industrial Court into an important 
labour instrument providing useful guidelines on the regulation of „grey areas‟, such as, in 
respect of dismissals and retrenchments.  
The period between 1990 to 1994 saw the birth of the new democratic South Africa. Given 
the active role played by workers and their trade unions in the struggle to end apartheid, it 
was hardly surprising that a lot of attention was given to labour rights in the new South 
Africa. Thus in 1994, the interim Constitution, Act 200 of 1993, came into effect. It made 
provision for the right to fair labour practices, the right to bargain collectively and the right to 
strike as some of the basic fundamental rights under Chapter 2, the Bill of Rights.  These 
rights would remain entrenched in the final Constitution that was later adopted by the first 
democratic legislative assembly in 1996.33 
Also in 1994, the new Department of Labour appointed a Ministerial Legal Task Team, the 
Cheadle Task Team34, to draft new labour legislation. As a result of the draft submissions of 
the Cheadle Task Team, and then some intensive debate by the National Economic 
Development and Labour Council (NEDLAC)35, the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995  (LRA) 
was born and came into effect on 11 November 1996. The LRA was followed by the Basic 
Conditions of Employment Act in 1997 (BCEA), and the Employment Equity Act (EEA) and 
the Skills Development Act (SDA) in 1998.  
The LRA remains the principal labour statute. It regulates collective rights36 and provides 
protection to individual employees against unfair dismissal and unfair labour practices. The 
LRA also regulates trade unions, employer organisations, the establishment of workplace 
structures and dispute resolution agencies, such as, the Commission of Conciliation, 
Mediation and Arbitration (CCMA) and Labour Courts.  The BCEA, on the other hand, 
establishes basic conditions of employment with respect to a standard contract of 
employment between only two parties and provides for enforcement on rights as well as 
duties.  The EEA prohibits all sorts of unfair discrimination in employment, defined to include 
a wide range of policies and procedures, including those that regulate access to 
employment.  Lastly, the SDA requires employers to contribute a percentage of their payrolls 
towards funding the infrastructure established by the SDA. All these Acts heralded a new era 
in South African labour law.  
The LRA was amended in 1998, and again in 2002. The amendments effected in 2002 were 
far more significant, and introduced revised procedures for larger-scale retrenchments and a 
                                               
33
 Section 23 of the Constitution deals specifically with labour relations. 
34
 Named after its chairman, Professor Halton Cheadle, who led that team in drafting to the new labour laws. 
35
 A tripartite body founded in 1995 that consists of representatives of government, organised labour and employers. 
36
 Such as, the right to organise, the right to strike and collective bargaining in section 11-22 of  the Labour Relations Act of 
1995. 
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right to strike when the substantive fairness of retrenchments is disputed. Van Niekerk 
expressed the view that the labour market is dynamic, and for that reason, labour legislation 
is never immune from critical reflection and, when necessary, revision. 37  
In 2005, Professor Halton Cheadle in an article entitled „Regulation Flexibility: Revisiting the 
LRA and the BCEA‟38 argued in favour of a series of reforms based on a consideration of 
whether the conceptual structure underpinning the current labour laws remained valid. His 
observations are particularly true if one looks at the recent influences of globalisation on the 
labour market with increases in non-standard forms of employment.  Indications given during 
the recent presidential „State of the Nation‟ addresses by President Jacob Zuma is that that 
amendments to labour laws are in the pipeline, particularly concerning the ongoing debates 
about labour broking. 
 
 
2.3 Namibia 
 
2.3.1 Population 
  
Just like South Africa, Namibia has conducted two successive censuses since 
independence in 1990. But Namibia has a far smaller population than its southern historical 
neighbour.  At the first national census in 1991 the population stood at 1.4 million 
inhabitants. In 2001 it increased to a total of 1.9 million people, and according to census 
report released by the National Planning Commission in April 2012, the population of Namibia 
increase to around 2.1 million after the 2011 National Housing and Population Census.39 
The report notes that more than 1, 2 million or 58 per cent  of the population in Namibia live 
in rural areas while 885 500 which is 42 per cent live in urban areas. There is, however, a 
clear indication that urbanisation in Namibia is on the increase when comparing it to the 
2001 results when 67 per cent were living in rural areas and 33 per cent in urban areas. 
According to the report, the calculated population of 2,1 million is actually 4 per cent lower 
than was initially expected. The Director-General of the National Planning Commission, Tom 
Alweendo, is quoted in the media as says that: 
 „The population has increased from the 1,8 million in 2001 by 15 per cent. This 
indicates an average growth of about 1,5 per cent per year „which is manageable 
relating to the economic growth of about 4,7% of the country‟. 
„We do not want our population to grow faster than our economy,‟ he stressed. 
                                               
37
 Van Niekerk A (ed), Christianson MA & McGregor M et al Law at Work (2008) 15. 
38
 Cheadle H Regulated Flexibility: Revisiting the LRA and the BCEA (2006) 27 ILJ 663  
39
 According to  The Namibian  Sun available at http://sun.com.na/content/national-news/census-results-put-population-21 
    million   (  accessed on 21 April 2013). 
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The Population and Housing Census is „extremely important in the development 
agenda of the country as it has immediate policy implications for education, health, 
social amenities and shelter‟, Alweendo said. 40 
Overall results from the 2011 Population and Housing Census show that urban figures have 
been changing rapidly due to the high urban migration rates that have taken place since 
independence in 1990 as more and more people have been moving to cities and towns 
across Namibia in search of any fixed jobs and wage incomes. 
 
 
2.3.2 Education Levels 
 
In Namibia, the position with regard to skilled and unskilled workers is very similar to that of 
South Africa and many other developing countries: there is an oversupply of unskilled 
workers (unemployment), and a shortage of skilled workers. 
 
According to the Namibian Labour Force Survey 2008, about 13.6 per cent of the population 
in Namibia had no formal education at all while 45.3 per cent attained or completed some 
level of primary education. Only about 1.2 per cent of the population obtained any tertiary 
education, and around 0.7 per cent post-graduate education. Unemployment is related to 
the levels of education as the bulk of the unemployed 59.9 per cent had only primary or 
junior secondary education. In contrast, less than 1 per cent of the unemployed had a post-
secondary education. 41 Thus just like in South Africa, the perceived unemployability of large 
sections of the population groups has created a large pool of desperate citizens. Labour 
brokers have exploited the unskilled population groups need for jobs.  
 
 
2.3.3 Unemployment Rate 
 
The Namibian government‟s definition of unemployment is based on three criteria, namely: 
 being without work, 
 being available for work, and  
 seeking work. 
 
As in the case South Africa, this „strict‟ definition of unemployment excludes from the ranks 
of the unemployed those individuals (15-65 years old) who are without jobs and available for 
work, but who are not actively seeking work. Jauch expresses concern that using the „strict‟ 
                                               
40
 See The Namibian  Sun available at http://sun.com.na/content/national-news/census-results-put-population-21 
    million   (  accessed on 21 April 2013)    
41
 The Namibian Labour Force Survey 2008: Final Report Windhoek: Ministry of Labour and National Planning Commission 
available at http://www.ilo.org/survey_libraries (accessed on 29 September 2011)     (hereafter The Namibian Labour Force 
Survey (2008). 
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definition of unemployment in the context of the Namibian labour market is problematic.42 He 
argues that to use the criterion „actively seeking for work‟ to classify the unemployed may not 
be accurate as many unemployed people may have stopped looking for work-not because 
they do not want to work, but simply because they may be demoralised and have given up 
all hope of finding a job. Others may not bother to seek work as they witness the fruitless 
efforts of their friends and relatives. Thus he points out that the criterion of „not seeking work‟ 
tells us very little and may not be a relevant criterion in labour markets that are characterised 
by mass unemployment. 
 
The “broad definition” of unemployment, on the other hand, regards every person between 
15-65 years and without work but available for work as being unemployed-whether he/she is 
looking for work or not. According to a Labour Force Survey conducted in 2008, 
unemployment in Namibia in terms of the broad definition stands at around 51.2 per cent, 
whilst this figure is reduced to 29.4 per cent when the strict definition is applied.43 
 
Barker argues that „high unemployment ... can be related to a high population growth rate, a 
low economic growth rate and declining labour intensity in the economy‟44. He states that far 
fewer job opportunities than in the past are now being created for every percentage point of 
economic growth. Thus despite the relatively modest looking 600 000 population growth 
from the first national census in 1991 to the last one in 2011, the new jobs created in the 
country are much few than the rate of the population growth thus creating an opportunity for 
exploitative working conditions such as that of some labour brokers. 
 
 
2.3.4 Economic Index 
 
Namibia is one of the richest countries in Africa with minerals, such as, diamonds, gold, 
copper, zinc and the world‟s second largest deposits of uranium.  The country‟s GNP per 
capita was calculated at $2334 USD in December 2005, compared with an African average 
of $681 USD for the same period. However, these averages do not reveal the huge income 
inequalities amongst the population.  The richest 5 per cent of the population controls 71 
percent of the GDP, with an average income of $14 000 USD per year. The poorest 55 per 
cent account only for 3 per cent of the GDP, with a per capita income of less than $100 USD 
per year. 
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 The Namibian Labour Force Survey (2008) 7. 
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In a recent survey on labour it was found that almost half of all Namibian households (41.8 
per cent) relied solely on „wages and salaries‟ as their main source of income.45 In his 
discussion on labour in Namibia, Jauch adds that in urban areas, like Windhoek, Walvis Bay 
and Swakopmund, this figure was as high as 76 per cent. 46  Thus an analysis of these 
figures gives a clear indication of the major importance of wages and salaries to the survival 
of many Namibian households and the potential detrimental effects of unemployment living 
those that cant find decent jobs and are less skilled to seek employment less favourable 
conditions offered by some labour brokers. 
 
 
2.3.5 History and Development of the Namibian Labour Laws  
 
For close to 116 years of German and South African colonial rule, South West Africa47 had 
never had any comprehensive labour legislation that identified and reflected the local 
working population. Especially in the era of South African rule , „Namibia‟ was treated as a 
fifth province of South Africa and this meant that almost all South African labour laws 
applied in Namibia.48  
 
Similar to experiences in early South Africa, up until the discovery of diamonds and gold, the 
early documented Namibian economy was largely agrarian, with the main economic activity 
being agriculture governed by a Master and Servant Act that regulated the relationship 
between German traders and indigenous people working on the farms. 
 
However, after the defeat of the German forces in World War I by Britain and its allies, that 
included the white South African government, the South West African territory was 
temporarily placed under the trusteeship of South Africa. This mandate was given by the 
League of Nations49 that was formed after the defeat of the Germans in the First World War. 
The trusteeship was only supposed to last until the indigenous population were educated 
and could take over to govern them. 
 
In 1948, the National Party came into power in South Africa. One of its first steps was to 
appoint the Botha Commission to revise all existing labour legislation including the status of 
black workers in the territory. The Commission recommended the establishment of a 
separate „co-ordinating body‟ with the aim of streamlining wages and other conditions of 
                                               
45
 The Namibian Labour Force Survey (2008) 1. 
46
 Jauch H Trade Unions in Namibia (2004) 12. 
47
 “South West Africa” was the given name of Namibia during the occupation years under German (1884-1914) and South 
Africa (1915-1989) until it gained independence in  1990. Although the main liberation movement SWAPO was using the 
name Namibia in exile and UN petitions decades before official independence.   
48
 Wiehahn N E Report of the Commission of Inquiry into Labour Matters in Namibia (1989) Windhoek  2. (hereafter Wiehahn 
Report on Namibia). 
49
 Later renamed the United Nations (UN) with various development agencies including the International Labour Organization 
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employment on the basis of skills levels rather than racial levels. However, the government 
ignored these recommendations and focused more on advancing Afrikaner nationalism 
policies 50  and promoting repressive labour laws against black workers and their union 
activists. During that time the National Party government passed a number of discriminatory 
Acts not only enforceable in South Africa but equally over the territory of South West Africa. 
 
Amongst these discriminatory laws which were forcefully carried over into the Namibian 
territory was the Wage and Industrial Conciliation Ordinance of 1952, which excluded black 
workers from the definition of employees and prevented black Namibian workers from 
legally forming or joining trade unions. 51 
 
In the 1970s  black workers in Namibia, allied with the exiled members of the main liberation 
movement, the South West African People‟s Organisation (SWAPO), organised themselves 
to form underground unions with affiliation to National Union of Namibia Workers (NUNW). 
They particularly intended to fight the exploitative apartheid contract labour system, the 
South West African Native Labour Administration (SWANLA)52.  According to Hishongwa in 
her book The Contract Labour System and its Effects on Family and Social Life in Namibia, 
for many decades SWANLA was used as a tool to break the social development of the black 
man and his family, by allowing the separation of thousands of fathers, brothers and sons as 
cheap labour at far away mines and farms, and many mothers as sleep-in domestic workers 
under exploitive conditions.53 
 
At the peak of the resistance against SWANLA, the unions and their members carried out a 
number of large industrial strikes country wide between 1986 and 1988. One such strike 
included about 4,000 mineworkers at the then Tsumeb Cooperation Limited (TCL) copper 
mine at Tsumeb. That was followed by one of about 3,000 workers of the then Consolidated 
Diamond Mines (CDM) at Oranjemund and another one of about 50,000 workers at the 
economic capital, Walvis Bay.  At one point, in protest against CDM‟s celebration of its 50th 
anniversary in 1986, workers stated: 
 
 „We, the toiling, sweating and oppressed Namibian workers, have nothing to 
celebrate, for we feel strongly that we have been discriminated against ... To us 50 
years of celebration are a reminder of 50 years of exploitation, over mining and 
oppression.‟ 54 
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 The Native Law Amendment Act 54 of 1952. 
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 Jauch H Trade Unions in Namibia (2004) 26. 
52
 Through the SWANLA system of labour, white industry owners could hire citizens, mostly blacks, from the State at minimal 
costs and benefits. 
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Following all these popular unrests and mounting international pressures, Namibia gained 
her national independence on 21 March 1990. Two years after independence, the new 
SWAPO government, which had led the liberation struggle for those exploited and 
marginalised under apartheid, introduced a new Labour Act in 1992 with the aim of 
consolidating labour related legislation into a single Act. The Act covered all workers within 
the boundaries of the Republic of Namibia regardless of colour, race, culture, religion or sex 
and provides for basic workers‟ rights and conditions for all. It further provided for the 
establishment of independent bodies to oversee the enforcement of its provisions, such as, 
the labour courts, a tripartite Labour Advisory Council, and of wage commissions to 
determine minimum wages in particular industries. 
 
Compared with the apartheid government‟s labour legislation, the Labour Act of 1992 
constituted a significant improvement for the workers and their unions. A large majority of 
the previously marginalised black workforce could now enjoy all the basic labour and trade 
union rights and could collectively bargain for improved conditions of employment. This Act 
would continue for years as the benchmark for standard employment relations between 
employers and employees in the Republic of Namibia.  
 
In 2004, at the turn of new millennium, a tripartite task force team was set up to assess the 
effectiveness of the Labour Act of 1992 after several protected strikes in the country had 
taken place. This team recommended the amendment of the 1992 Act to, amongst others 
replace the district labour courts with a speedier and more economical system of alternate 
dispute resolution through arbitration and conciliation. More significantly it recommended 
certain regulation changes to accommodate the rapid increasing phenomenon of third-party 
employments in the country. This led to the eventual enactment of the Labour Act, 2004, 
which provided not only for a new system of dispute prevention and resolution, but also for 
several improvements in the minimum conditions of employment, and for extensive 
measures addressing the practice of labour brokers. 
 
However, the 2004 Act could not be put into effect in it is entirely because of several 
technical flaws that prevented its implementation, especially the provisions dealing with 
vacation and maternity benefits. The Namibian Employer‟s Federation also took issue with 
each improvement of minimum conditions of employment and debated the merits of these 
benefits with government. 
 
During 2005, the Namibian Ministry of Labour and Social Welfare instituted a complete 
technical review of the entire 2004 Act, a process that would result in scores of technical 
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revisions in order to streamline the Act and to „close inadvertently-caused loopholes‟ such 
as banning labour brokers. These subsequently resulted in a new Labour Bill of 2006, which 
Parliament eventually adopted as the current existing Labour Act, 200755. 
 
However the new Labour Act of 2007, especially section 128 that sought to prohibit labour 
brokers, was challenged in the courts of Namibia for the constitutionality of it. African 
Personnel Services (APS) at the time one of the biggest labour broking companies sought a 
court interdict to stop the implementation of section 128 shortly after the coming into 
operation of the new Labour Act, 2007.  After the High Court of Namibia initially ruled that 
the ban under the new Act was legal as labour broking carried traces of the SWANLA 
contract labour system from the apartheid era,  APS took its case to the Supreme Court of 
Namibia. In December 2009, the Supreme court found that the outright outlawing of labour 
hire was an unreasonable infringement of article 21 (1) (j) of the Constitution‟s protection of 
the right to practise any profession, or carry on any occupation, trade or business. The court 
rather ruled that government should look into a regulatory framework.56  
 
From the above discussions, it is clear that the rights of workers in Namibia has a long and 
very sensitive history that has played a major role in how existing labour laws were enacted 
and thus the strong calls to ban the recent phenomenon of labour broking for breaking down 
everything achieved. However the courts have noted that despite the deep history of 
workers‟ rights in the country and the need to safe guard these rights, is not legally viable to 
ban labour brokers in country were the constitution that strongly supports free choice of 
enterprise and trade thus they have in essence noted that there is a need for an regulatory 
approach that reconciles the protection of workers‟ rights and the interests of the business 
sector. 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
LABOUR BROKING AND THE NEW WORLD OF WORK 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
The new context of globalisation has presented the world of work with both promises and 
problems. For developing nations, such South Africa and Namibia, „globalisation has made 
the pursuit of development and maintenance of internal and external stability difficult and 
delicate tasks. On the one hand, globalisation holds out to participants the promise of growth 
in trade and international investments; on the other hand it heightens the risks of instability 
and marginalisation‟57. As young democracies, both South Africa and Namibia first had to 
face challenges in ensuring that previous practices of exploitation and marginalisation 
against the majority population groups were corrected with legislation providing for fairness, 
and at the same time this legislation had to drive the new economies towards 
competitiveness on the global stage. One of the key developments in the labour market 
resulting from this phenomenon of globalisation is that more and more companies prefer to 
keep workers around for the minimum possible time in order to cut costs during hardship 
times, such as, strikes, labour unrest and untimely leaves. Sweet and Meiksins highlighted 
that „in the “new economy”, the drive to create more efficient and profitable enterprises had 
influenced the distribution of work, which as a result some jobs that used to be plentiful had 
virtually disappeared, and the skills needed to obtain such jobs are changing as well.‟ 58 This 
indicated a broad shift from the traditional standard form of employment to a flexible 
approach driven by the constant pursuit of maximum profits in the ever dynamic competitive 
world of business. The globalisation phenomenon gave rise to many forms of non-standard 
employment, of which that of labour brokers is the one that has drawn the most attention 
both in South Africa and Namibia. 59 
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 Barker 2003: 181 in A new agenda for being human … again … in the world of work (2007) available at http://www.mywage.com/main/  
(accessed on 5 April 2011). 
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 Sweet S and Meiksins P Changing Contours of Work: Job and Opportunities in the New Economy (2008)14. 
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3.2  What are Labour Brokers? 
 
Labour brokers are businesses established in recent times to provide “flexible” labour 
services, usually unskilled and semi-skilled for short and medium-term periods to various 
client companies. The brokers would conclude commercial agreements with the client 
companies in terms of which a labour broker is paid for labour services being rendered by a 
certain number of workers requested by the „client‟. The brokers would then remunerate the 
workers with a wage percentage from the payment they invoice to the clients. Most labour 
brokers retain a substantial part of a worker‟s hourly wage rates, anything between 15 and 
55 per cent, as their fee. 60  Currently the courts cannot protect these workers against 
massive deductions, since the existing law is very limited in controlling labour brokers. 
However, sound regulations can help determine the maximum percentage deductable for 
specified labour broking categories and industries. 
 
Currently, in the absence of clear policies on labour brokers no registration data is available 
to provide clear figures on the number of employees and types of groups employed by 
brokers. Study counts have been limited to a few commissioned studies by the state labour 
departments and a few papers prepared by private individuals. However, it is agreed is that 
South Africa has a far more vibrant labour broking industry than Namibia. Its industry 
comprises of hundreds of businesses that have emerged, mostly in the post-apartheid era of 
the “new South Africa”, to supply labour operations to various clients in manufacturing, 
farming, retail, mining and other large scale economic contributors. In Namibia, as Jauch 
points out, that „the labour broking industry is dominated by one large company, which 
originated from South Africa and now operates across Namibia‟.61 In addition, he mentions 
that there are several other smaller labour brokers most of whom are limited to serving a few 
clients, mostly in one particular town. Jauch highlights that they all mostly supply workers to 
client companies in various industries, including, mining, fishing, and retail. Their clients 
include both private companies and state owned enterprises (SOEs).  
 
Since the period of democratisation and passing of new labour laws, more and more 
companies in South Africa and Namibia, like everywhere else around the world, are now 
adopting the new flexible labour „temporary employment services‟ 62  to cope with the 
competitive edge of the new global market. In the absence of statutory regulation or 
                                               
60
 Jauch H Namibia‟s Labour Hire Debate in Perspective (2010) 2. 
61
 Jauch H (2010) 2. 
62
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prohibition, the current triangular employments are not illegal.63   However, only South Africa 
has set any form of guidelines on how to deal with the emergence of this form of 
employment. Section 198 (1) of the LRA initially defined a temporary employment service as: 
„any person who, for reward, procures for or provides to a client other persons- 
(a) who render services to, or perform work for the client; and 
(b) who are remunerated by the temporary employment service‟.  
  
Alarmingly however, Van der Burg, Lindoor & Messina et al point out that „these businesses 
enjoy the benefit of the labour without adherence to the legal framework of labour legislation 
as the labour broker “takes care” of the legal implications‟.64 This is a relationship where the 
remuneration of the workers comes from a different third party (as expressed in (b) above) 
rather than directly from the entity where their labour service is rendered and currently falls 
outside the legal definitions of an employee under existing labour laws. Thus, technically no 
recognised contract of employment exists between the client and the worker. The current 
situation has led to  „an unregulated environment for labour brokers operations, which if not 
regulated will continue to leave workers at greater risk of exploitation and with very little legal 
grounds to challenge unfair dismissal and bargain poor working conditions‟65.  
 
3.3 The “Elusive” Employee 
Although more and more companies have opted for the new practice of replacing the 
traditional full-time, permanent, employer-employee relationship with a triangular commercial 
engagement, the reality is that the current operations of labour brokers show features of the 
existence of an employment relationship and should theoretically comply to labour laws.  
The existing definitions of an employee in both the South African LRA 66 and BCEA67 were 
initially drafted on the basis of the traditional contract of employment as per the common law 
locatio conductio operarum developed from Roman times64 and thus seem a bit left behind 
by the evolution of globalisation.  Currently the LRA defines an employee as: „any person, 
excluding an independent contractor, 
a) who works for another person or for the State, and who receives or is entitled to 
receive, any remuneration;  
b) and any other person who, in any manner, assists in carrying on or conducting 
the business of an employer‟68. 
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Similarly the Namibian Labour Act (NLA)69 defines an employee to mean „any individual, 
other than an independent contractor who; 
a) works for another person and who receives, or is entitled  to receive, 
remuneration for that  work; or 
b) in any manner assists in carrying on or conducting the business of an employer‟. 
 
Under recent employment forms of labour broking, the above definitions of an employee in 
the Labour Acts of both countries clearly leave a big gap for labour brokers to exploit without 
any legal obligation. Both Acts read that an employee „receives or is entitled to receive 
remuneration for assisting to conduct the business of that employer‟. However, in labour 
broking operations where the workers assist to conduct activities of a certain client company 
but then are remunerated by the broker, such workers fall clearly outside the scope of the 
defined employee in these Acts. Technically, the workers do not work or assist with 
conducting the business of the labour broker but rather that of the client company were their 
are based for the majority of their time. However since they are directly recruited by the 
brokers and receive their remuneration from the brokers the client company has no legal 
obligation to these employees. Thus it means only the labour broker is liable for any unfair 
dismissals and unlawful labour practices, whether committed by the broker or the client 
company.  
 
However, the courts have identified some features that resemble a employee-employer 
relationship between client and hired workers. In South Africa, years before the existence of 
the current labour laws, South African court in Smit v Workmen‟s Compensation 
Commissioner 70  summarised a list of factors that, at common law, it considered were 
indicative of an employment relationship between an employee and a client. These factors 
were then translated into the LRA71 and the BCEA72  through amendments made in 2002 to 
define the existence of any employment relationship.  The Amendment Acts would consider 
a direct relationship of employment to exist if any one or more of the following factors were 
present: 
 
a) „The manner in which the person works is subject to the control or direction of 
another person; 
b) The person‟s hours of work are subject to the control or direction of another 
person; 
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c) In the case of a person who works for an organisation, the person is a part of that 
organisation; 
d) The person has worked for that other person for an average of at least forty hours 
per month over the last three months; 
e) The person is economically dependent on the other person for whom that person 
works or renders services; 
f) The person is provided with tools of trade or work equipment by the other person; 
or 
g) The person only works for or renders services to one person‟.73 
 
Looking at the above listed employment factors as summarised, we can determine whether 
there exist some grounds for the client company to carry some legal liability for the workers 
placed by a labour broker. First, it is know that the workers in labour broking operations are 
usually under the supervision and control of the client business, rather than the broker. 
Secondly, a substantial fraction of the prescribed maximum forty-five hours of work per 
week, in terms of the Labour Acts, are spend on the premises of the client business, rather 
than at the premises of the broker. Thirdly, it is the client company that usually supplies all 
the work equipment, provides training, sets targets, and guides the day-to-day duties of the 
workers. All this factors point to some form of an employment relationship in existence 
between the client and those workers that are placed by the labour brokers. Therefore,  
amendments to labour laws, especially in Namibia should extend more legal liability to the 
client, based on the factors mentioned in Workmen‟s Compensation Commissioner as South 
Africa did in the amendments of LRA 200A and BCEA 83A. This will allow employees to 
seek damages against both the broker and the client in case of unfair labour practices. 
 
However, despite the factors listed in the Smit case as well as now LRA section 200A and 
BCEA section 83A, pointing to the existence of an employment relationship between client-
employee, the current definition of an employee is enforced by post-democracy Roman 
legislation where a contract of employment is only known to exist between two parties, the 
employee and the labour broker. Thus the courts will not recognise that a labour broking 
employee is in a contract of employment with a client to entitle him/her to seek for damages 
for unfair labour practices in the CCMA or the LC. So the current LRA and NLA definitions of 
who is an employee have become more and more left behind by non-standard labour 
broking employment that emerged out of the global need for companies to be more human 
resource effective and financially competitive, thus leading them to hire labour services 
through third-parties without any accountability to the labourer and thus a legal „vacuum‟ has 
developed in existing labour laws. Thus reconstructions are need to the scope and definition 
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of the employee in existing labour law to succeed in the protection of these workers rights. 
Now whenever a labour broker is involved in the recruitment of a worker, it is no longer 
considered to be an employment relationship by law, but rather a form of independent 
commercial contracting, limited with regard to the protection guidelines subscribed to by 
current labour laws.   
 
 
3.4 The Current Legislation on Labour Brokers in Namibia and South Africa 
 
In Namibia, apart from recent drastic demands for a ban, the legislation is completely silent 
in protecting the rights workers employed by labour brokers. For many years workers in this 
sector have been working in a „vacuum‟  unprotected by legislation, allowing labour brokers 
and their clients to hire and fire this employees at will without giving the prescribed  
termination notices, severance pay, and such.  
 
As mentioned earlier, South Africa has taken a slightly different approach to that of Namibia 
in dealing with the existence of labour brokers. Section 198 of the LRA provisions were 
inserted to govern labour brokers or Temporary Employment Services (TES) as they are 
referred to in the Act. The Act refers to TES, as „any person who, for reward, procures for or 
provides to a client other persons who render services to, or perform work for, the client‟74.   
In this South African Act the worker‟s rights are partially protected specifically through s198 
(4) of the Act which makes it clear that „the client is jointly and severally liable with the labour 
broker if there is a contravention of: 
1) a collective agreement concluded in a bargaining council that regulates terms 
and conditions of employment; 
2) a binding arbitration award that regulates terms and conditions of employment; 
3) the BCEA; or 
4) a sectoral determination‟.75  
 
However, according to Benjamin „s198 of the LRA recognises TES without regulating 
them‟.76 He states that this has allowed a situation to occur in which „TES has been used to 
establish relationships that deprive employees of fundamental legislative protections‟. 
Subsequently, the courts have ruled that under s198, a client company incurs no obligation 
in connection with unfair dismissals and unlawful labour practices suffered by employees of 
labour brokers, even if the violations were committed by that client.   It was confirmed in April 
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v Workforce Group Holdings (Pty) Ltd77, that the client company cannot be held responsible 
for any unfair conduct by the labour broker since Mr April (the worker) was not an employee 
of the client. Thus, every time a client hires workers from a labour broker, the client company 
is legally not prosecutable for any violations in working conditions experienced by the 
workers, such as, unfair dismissals with no severance pay or notification. 78 According to 
Gericke this is in direct contrast with the all inclusive purpose and objects of Employment 
Equity Act79 which aim to avoid all forms of unfair discrimination in the workplace.80   Thus, 
clearly the labour laws of both countries are still falling short for reaching the levels of 
protection accorded to the rights and conditions of employees in traditional forms of 
employment. 
 
3.5 The Position of the International Labour Organisation (ILO) 
 
Debates over the operation of triangular employment in labour markets have a long history 
since the 18 century trade in slaves.  It was the early campaigns to end slavery that 
eventually gave birth to the ILO through the adoption of the Treaty of Versailles in 1919, 
which entrenched various core principles relating to the rights of workers at the end of World 
War I.81  
 
Shortly after the ILO was founded, it called for the abolition of all forms of master and 
servant type slavery relationships. This was given effect by ILO Convention No. 34 (1935), 
proposing the abolition of profit-making employment agencies in favour of a state monopoly. 
In the case of South Africa and Namibia, the favouring of a state labour monopoly led to the 
introduction of a web of apartheid regulations promoting the exploitation of the black 
population through discriminatory labour systems in the 1900s. Notwithstanding that the 
apartheid government subsequently faced heavy international sanctions and isolation for 
years, this system would remain in place until the new political dispensation of the early 
1990s. 
 
In 1949, an international „demand for contingent labour created a demand for service 
providers, a demand not efficiently met by state actors and to which private entrepreneurs 
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responded, despite legal restrictions or prohibitions‟82. Nghisililwa states that over the next 
following years the demand for change could no longer be ignored and this gave birth to the 
development of labour brokers internationally.83 At the same time ILO, Convention No.96 on 
Fee-charging Employment Agencies, which formed the legal basis of an ILO tenet that 
labour is not a commodity, was revised. Adopted in 1949, ILO Convention 96 only regulated 
work recruitment and placement; basically, it authorised limited exceptions to the rule laid 
down in ILO Convention 34 of 1935.84 
 
In recent years, the ILO has been focused on workers who find themselves outside the 
protection of labour legislations. Among them are workers employed in a triangular 
employment relationship, such as that of labour broking, namely, when they are „… 
employees of an enterprise (the provider) to perform work for a third party (the user 
enterprise) to whom their employer provides labour or services‟85. Thus in recent years, the 
ILO‟s adoption of Convention 181 of 1997 on Private Employment Agencies served as a 
response to the serious tension within the prevailing regulatory regimes associated with the 
standard employment relationship. Raday, pointed out that this tension centres on the 
perceived necessity to transform the normative model of employment, while simultaneously 
preserving security for workers engaged in employment relationships where responsibility 
could not be placed squarely on one entity in full. 86 
 
Furthermore, Nghishililwa discusses that ILO Convention 181 on Private Employment 
Agencies not only recognises private employment agencies as employers, but also 
establishes a minimum level of protection for their employees, who are made available to a 
user enterprise to perform contract labour.87 He states that by adopting Convention 181, the 
ILO had to reverse its historic stance against labour market intermediaries and revise its 
sceptical view of non-standard forms of employment. According to him, in a way ILO, 
Convention 181 also legitimises a triangular employment relationship, shifting from the 
standard employment relationship towards a new model which embraces more flexible forms 
of employment.  
 
More significantly, in the 1997 Convention on Private Employment Agencies, the ILO went 
as far as giving standard definitions for the operation of a private employment agency. The 
definition concerning the current operations of labour brokers is in Article 1 (b) of Convention 
181 which defines the term private employment agency as:  
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-any natural or legal person, independent of the public authorities, which provides 
one or more of the following labour market services: „Services consisting of 
employing workers with a view to making them available to a third   party, who may 
be a natural or legal person which assigns their tasks and supervises the execution 
of these tasks‟. 88 
 
All in all, it is clear that since the adoption of the last Conventions on Fee-charging 
Employment Agencies shortly after the end of World War I to give better rights and decent 
work standards to slave workers, the laws have encountered many challenges in keeping up 
with the nature of work in the new global economy. As time went by there had been an 
increase in labour conflicts between the rights and interests of all parties in an employment 
relationship. The ILO recognised that the workers, on the one hand, were looking for greater 
security for their rights and for decent work standards. On the other hand, the ILO also was 
faced with employers arguing for more flexibility in the laws. Thus, with time there was a 
need for an updated regulatory framework, such as the ILO‟s Convention 34 of 1935 
concerning Private Employment Agencies, to incorporate the competitive forces of 
globalisation without diminishing worker‟s rights.89 Even so, the ILO still places responsibility 
on individual member states to determine the decent work conditions governing the 
operations of private employment agencies. The ILO agency recommends the introduction of 
a system of licensing or certification of private employment agencies except where they are 
otherwise regulated or determined by appropriate national laws. 90   Thompson, in his 
publication The changing nature of employment of 2003, stressed the importance of 
“nationalition” of labour legislation quoting the remarks made by the Director-General of the 
ILO when he reported in 1999 on the quest for decent work – 
 
„The goal is not just the creation of jobs, but the creation of jobs of acceptable quality. 
The quantity of employment cannot be divorced from its quality. All societies have a 
notion of decent work, but the quality of employment can mean many things. It could 
relate to different forms of work, and also to different conditions of work, as well as 
feelings of value and satisfaction. The need today is to devise social and economic 
systems which ensure basic security and employment while remaining capable of 
adaptation to rapidly changing circumstances in a highly competitive global market.‟  
„The future cannot be a forecast - it must be a goal. The question is the future that we 
want, and how we can make it happen. The future is not yet written. .The answer is 
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to give the global economy the widespread social legitimacy it lacks today by making 
markets work for everybody.‟91 
 
Today, apart from the respective Labour Acts, the Constitutions of South African and 
Namibia guarantee a number of fundamental rights and the promotion fair labour practices 
and employment equality standards to all workers, including employees in the labour broking 
sector as recommended by the ILO conventions. According to the ILO, decent work is 
captured in four strategic objectives: fundamental principles, rights at work and international 
labour standards; employment and income opportunities; social protection and social 
security; and social dialogue and tripartism.92 
 
While ILO Convention 181 of 1997 on Private Employment Agencies also provides that 
workers recruited by private employment agencies should not be denied the right to freedom 
of association and the right to bargain collectively, a right which is currently not exercised by 
most labour broking workers.93  In addition, under Convention 181, private agencies are 
prohibited to charge directly or indirectly, in whole or in part, any fees or costs to workers 
they place with third-parties.94 Thus member states are obliged to ensure that the necessary 
measures are taken to provide adequate protection for workers employed by private 
employment agencies with regard to their working conditions.95 
 
Recently the ILO's Employment Relationship Recommendation of 2006 further proposed 
that countries should adopt policies to ensure that employment protection is available to all 
forms of employment relationships, including those involving multiple parties.96 Benjamin 
stressed that labour laws should seek to ensure 'that employees in triangular relationship 
enjoy the same level of protection traditionally provided by the law for employers that have 
bilateral employment relationships, without impeding legitimate private and public business 
initiatives'97.  This will require adopting laws that are regulatory in nature, rather than try to 
unconstitutionally ban this form of employment completely. 
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3.6 Other Non-Standard Employments: Differences and Similarities 
 
In his publication on labour brokers tiltled Namibia‟s Labour Hire Debate in Perspective,  
Jauch highlights that one of the challenges to overcome in addressing workers rights as 
against labour brokers, is that this form of non-standard employment constitutes only one 
form of outsourcing that co-exists with other forms, such as, cleaning and security sub-
contractors.98 He points outs that „outlawing labour brokers while allowing other forms of 
outsourcing to continue could result in labour brokers re-constituting themselves as service 
providers‟ with little change in the rights of their employees. Jauch argues that the NLA tried 
to define labour brokers broadly without drawing a clear line between that and other forms of 
outsourcing. The aim was to compel employers to rather employ their staff directly and to 
shoulder some social responsibility for their workers‟ rights. Employers were, however, still 
able to employ staff on a temporary basis (if they could not be employed permanently) as the 
NLA contained no restrictions in this regard.99 
 
3.6.1 Labour Brokers versus Independent Contractors 
 
Independent contracting has recently become one of the main forms of employment that 
some labour brokers use in their attempts to disguise their exploitive operations and the 
unfair working conditions of their workers from legal liability. According to a LaRRI study 
report titled Labour hire in Namibia: current practices and effects , some contracts issued by 
labour brokers treat workers as “independent contractors” and state that „the contractor will 
only be remunerated for the actual hours worked‟, which implies that no payment is due 
during leave, including sick leave or maternity leave.100 Furthermore, the contract states that 
„the contractor will avail him or herself to perform duties on Sunday or Public holidays if so 
required‟101. In other words, the labour broking workers have to issue a “blank cheque” 
regarding their availability for work on those days.  
 
Under both the LRA and NLA an independent contractor is excluded from the legal definition 
of an employee and therefore not subject to the Labour Act provisions guiding the 
employment relationship between employers and their employees, such as, severance pay, 
strike rules, and retrenchment procedures, amongst others.102 The Acts define an employee 
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as „any person, excluding an independent contractor, who works for another person or for 
the State, and who receives or is entitled to receive, any remuneration‟103. 
 
According to van Niekerk, the origins of independent contracting „can be traced to the 
Roman law origins that dealt with the determination of who is an employee and who is an 
independent contractor‟104. In Colonial Mutual Life Assurance Society v MacDonald105, the 
court noted that under Roman law an employment contract „is one of letting and hiring of 
services‟ under a contract of employment (locatio conductio operarum).106 It held that under 
Roman law an independent contractor agreement „is the letting and hiring of some defined 
piece of work‟ (locatio conductio operis).107 The current structure and operations of labour 
brokers have strong features of a contract of employment rather than independent 
contracting.   Labour broking businesses are involved in the hiring and letting of labour 
services on an ongoing basis, rather than of some defined piece of work. 
 
On the other hand, cleaning and security services are provided by independent contractors 
but are often mistakenly categorised as falling in the same category as labour broking since 
most cleaning and security workers are often also unskilled or semi-skilled and provided with 
very low wages. Furthermore, like labour broking employees, cleaning and security workers 
perform their activities at the premises of the client company rather than the hiring company 
that pays their salary and they can similarly be easily rotated among different clients. 
However, the most significant difference between these two forms of employment lies 
therein that one involves a labour-only contracting (labour brokers) and the other a specific-
job contracting. To use the indicators mentioned in Colonial Mutual Life Assurance Society v 
MacDonald, labour brokers would mostly involve “the hiring and letting of a (labour) service”, 
while cleaning and security services would involve “the letting and hiring of some defined 
piece of work” such a guarding or cleaning under the fulltime control and supervision of the 
original hiring party and not the client.108  
 
Renowned Labour law writer, John Grogan in one of his publications titled Employment 
Rights, adds that over recent years the South African courts have further developed tests to 
identify the existence of a contract of employment or independent contracting through the 
application of the dominant impression test between different forms of non-standard 
employment. 109  The test establishes that the central characteristic of all contracts of 
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employment is the employer‟s ability to „control and supervise the manner in which employee 
perform their work by following instructions and obeying commands‟110 of the company. In 
the agreement between the client company and the labour broker, it is more often the client 
company rather than the labour broker that passes everyday work instructions, and provides 
training and equipment for the workers hired. A true independent contractor does not receive 
that from the client; even security and cleaning companies provide their own instructions, 
training and equipment to their workers.  
 
Other decisive indicators that a court would look at under the dominant impression test to 
determine the key differences between the work of labour brokers and independent 
contractors are that normally someone who is a labour broker worker is assigned specific 
„office‟ hours and is not allowed to work for anyone else during those hours, while an 
independent contractor could freely work on more than one project at any given time.  A 
case study report on Labour Brokerage on Fruit Farms in Grabouw established that: 
 
„A true independent contractor will be a registered provisional taxpayer who runs 
his/her own business and therefore works his/her own hours. The person will invoice 
the employer each month for his/her services rendered and be paid adequately but 
not be subject to usual ‟employment‟ matters such as the deduction of PAYE or UIF 
from his/her invoice, will not receive a car allowance, annual leave, sick leave, 13th 
cheque and so on.‟111 
 
This differentiation between independent contractors and standard contracts of employment 
is very important in adjudicating labour cases in the new global economy.  Many labour 
brokers would often unfairly dismiss their employees and classify them as independent 
contractors. This unlawful disguise was demonstrated in the landmark South African case of 
LAD Brokers (Pty) Ltd v Mandla112. In this case, LAD Brokers concluded an “independent 
contractor” agreement with Mandla, which entailed that the services of Mandla be „let‟ from 
the “books” of LAD Brokers by a client company.  When the client company gave notice to 
cancel its contract with LAD Brokers, LAD Brokers also terminated the contract between 
itself and Mandla. In its evidence to the court, LAD Brokers conceded that it was indeed a 
party to a triangular arrangement, but contended that Mandla was an independent contractor 
under it and thus by virtue of s198 (3)113 of the LRA of both LAD Brokers and the client 
company were not liable as regards the unfair dismissal provisions under s198 (4). 
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The court was faced with the following question in the LAD Brokers case: which relationship 
is relevant in order to establish whether Mandla was in fact an independent contractor or 
labour broker employee? The court held that the relationship to be considered was the one 
between Mandla and the client, and not LAD Broker‟s relationship with the client. Based on 
the common law tests, such as, the supervision and control test and the dominant 
impression test, the Labour Appeal Court held: 
 
„The nature of the relationship between the parties [is] to be determined primarily from the 
contract between them. The contract between the appellant (LAD Brokers) and the 
respondent (Mandla) expressly provided that the respondent was an independent contractor. 
However, the label chosen by the parties was not definitive. The contract also provided ... that 
the appellant had the right to terminate the agreement if the respondent‟s conduct  adversely 
affected its reputation, and that the respondent would observe standards set by the appellant 
and promote its interests  ... the further question was whether , if the respondent rendered 
service to the client company as an employee, Mandla also had the same relationship with 
the appellant by virtue of the Act ... the clear intention of the Act is too ensure that persons 
such as  labour brokers who pay employees remuneration be held liable as employers ... in 
terms of the Act the respondent  was deemed an employee of the appellant ... [and the] 
termination of his services ... subsequently amounted to a dismissal‟.
114
 
 
Thus, the court found that the broker was the employer and that the employee was not an 
independent contractor. 
 
3.6.2 Labour Brokers versus Recruitment Agencies 
 
In the middle of the ongoing concerns about the practice of labour brokers, one other 
employment confusion on the part of critics of labour broking is the inability to distinguish 
between the activities of labour brokers and those of recruitment agencies. As discussed 
earlier under section 3.2, labour brokers are businesses that supply labour services to assist 
in conducting the activities of client companies through a commercial agreement. This 
agreement is usually for a specified period of time as requested by the client (needs) for 
which the broker will invoice the client according to the scale of labour requested. The broker 
will administer the payroll function for those workers and continue to pay a certain 
percentage wage to the worker until the contract lapses or until the time agreed in the 
commercial contract lapses.   
 
Recruitment agencies, on the other hand, are approached by a client company to assist in 
filling certain vacant positions with candidates having certain qualities at a once-off flat rate 
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fee paid by the client. The agent will then take charge of the basic human resources 
activities on behalf of the client, such as, job advertisement, screening of applications, 
psychometrical tests and reference checks, as part of the recruitment and selection process. 
Once the agent has assessed the candidates, they will then submit a report to the client 
company about the abilities of all candidates assessed and recommend which candidate is 
the most employable. However, the onus is still on the company to make the final decision, 
or whether to disregard that recommendation and appoint alternatives. But what is important 
is that once the recruitment agency has submitted the report, the involvement of the agency 
ends. The candidate that is recommended\d becomes the direct responsibility of the client 
business: on its payroll, and in terms of the regular standard two-party contract of 
employment.   On the other hand, in the case of labour brokers, once they are approached 
to do a certain job project, they themselves would screen and make the final decision 
regarding the suitable workers, and will continue to administer the remunerations and 
benefits for those workers until the client terminates the commercial contract with the broker.  
 
3.7 Reasons why Modern Businesses Engage Labour Brokers 
 
Businesses everywhere in the new world engage brokers to maintain a competitive edge in 
terms of ensuring a continuous maximum workforce performance and to pursue better profit 
by outperform their rivals. According to Hall, costs and flexibility are the two major 
motivations for employers‟ use of labour brokers. He further states that „flexibility is probably 
the most well-known reason for labour market transformation in the industrialised world and 
its impact on workers can be minimised by thorough regulation of flexible labour and through 
the protection of acceptable employment conditions‟115. Some research studies conducted 
by the Labour Resource and Research Institute (LaRRI)116 in Namibia, as well as one by Jan 
Theron117 and information gathered by the Department of Labour (DoL) Survey of 2004 in 
South Africa pointed to some of the reasons why companies use labour brokers. The LaRRI 
and DoL studies entailed wide-ranging interviews with companies who hire employees 
through labour brokers. Companies provided the following reasons for employing labour 
broker workers instead of employing all their staff directly: 
 
a) Flexibility and cost cutting  
The reduction of labour costs and the enhancement of flexibility linked to uncertainty and 
competition in the business environment add to the advantages of entering into an 
agreement with a labour broker.118 The labour brokers can provide workers on demand for 
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specific hours, days or weeks. They thus allow companies to order workers when they are 
needed and to send them home when there is no work. Labour brokers also allow 
businesses to replace staff quickly for short periods, e.g. during holidays and peak seasons, 
in case of sickness and even during strikes. Client companies only pay for the hours actually 
worked, as they do not pay for workers who do not come to work. In such cases the labour 
broker will provide a replacement. One executive of a manufacturing company explained 
that: 
 
„It is cheaper for us to employ workers through a labour broker as we don‟t have to 
pay the benefits such as housing medical aid etc. We also don‟t have to pay if a 
worker does not come to work‟.119  
 
Another manager added:  
„When permanent workers go on leave you can‟t replace them. If you do, it costs the 
company money. I will feel it when my permanent worker goes on leave but I don‟t 
feel it if a labour broking worker goes on leave‟.120 
 
b) Concentrating on “core business”  
 
Linked to the above argument is the practice of outsourcing labour relations to a labour 
broker so that the clients can concentrate on other aspects of their business: „The broker will 
take over the management of the staff so that we can concentrate on our core business‟121, 
said a manager of a retail store that makes use of labour brokers.  
 
The managing director of a prominent fish processing company added: 
„If the owner had to employ many people such as HR managers, assistants to the 
manager etc. it would be too costly and the business would shut down. If the owner 
still had to deal with HR issues he would have no time to concentrate on running the 
company. This is why we use labour brokers to deal with labour issues‟122. 
 
Another manager of a manufacturing company pointed out that: 
„[The] Labour broker is not the only company servicing us. There are a host of 
contractors to carry out specific tasks such as window cleaning, pest control, 
gardening, electrical services engineering etc. This is part of the company‟s strategy 
to concentrate on its core business while subcontracting all other work to specialists 
in their specific fields‟123. 
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c) Access to skilled and qualified workers  
 
One company pointed out that their labour brokers supplied them with highly skilled workers 
at short notice when the need arose. This saved them the costs associated with employing 
skilled workers on a permanent basis.124 In addition, wage levels for lesser-skilled workers 
can easily be reduced as there is usually no requirement to ensure that workers placed by a 
labour broker receive the same level of remuneration as permanent workers of the client for 
similar work. 125 
 
However, that company acknowledged that the disadvantage was that the company had „to 
use different people all the time and risk injury on the job and lack of skills or expertise‟126. 
 
d) Replacing “unproductive” workers  
 
A manager of a manufacturing company outlined this argument:  
„If a labour broking worker does not perform well, we can inform the broker company 
not to send that worker back again and instead provide us with a hard working 
worker. This allows for high productivity for the company, as only hard working 
workers will be deployed at our company. Thus you get more out of a labour broking 
worker than your own permanent worker.‟127  
 
Some other client companies also indicated that they experienced labour broking workers as 
more productive, possibly because they wanted to be appointed as permanent workers in 
future.  
 
However, not all companies shared this view as shown in the following statement:  
„The disadvantage of using labour broking workers is that we don‟t have an influence 
over the choice of workers. We have to take whomever the broker sends us…Also I 
have the impression that labour broking employees don‟t take their work that 
seriously. They regard themselves as temporary employees and don‟t see much of a 
future with us…there is a kind of a “could not care less” attitude, which is a pity. Also 
we lose trained people overnight due to the high levels of staff turnover at labour 
brokers.‟128 
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e) Avoiding disciplinary cases 
 
Another widespread reason for the use of workers from labour brokers is to avoid the 
procedures for disciplinary action set out in the Labour laws. A director at a big company in 
the Namibian economy pointed out that:  
 
„If we have trouble with a labour broking worker, we simply phone the broker and 
they take care of it. Disciplinary cases are quite a burden in the case of permanent 
staff while it is easy for us in the case of labour broking workers. We lodge a 
complaint with the broker who reacts promptly. If no solution can be found, the 
worker will be replaced. This saves us the trouble of dealing with workers who 
sometimes come to work drunk or are simply absent without a valid reason. This is 
an advantage for us although it is not positive from a worker‟s perspective.‟129  
 
Confirming this view, a consultant of a retail store explained: 
 
„Initially the company employed workers directly but disciplinary matters took a lot of 
time and were expensive. Labour laws are tough and every small thing usually ends 
up in court. Now the labour broker deals with the labour issues.‟130 
 
f) Avoiding trade unions  
 
Workers hired from a labour broker are seldom represented by a union, which leaves them 
in vulnerable position as individuals in respect of negotiations as they are hardly in a position 
to negotiate for better working conditions or more favourable terms in their contract of 
employment with a broker.131The owner of a construction company stated that: 
 
 „I started using labour brokers because of the unreasonable requests and 
foolishness of the trade unions. You have to deal with unreasonable requests for very 
high salary increases. The problem with unions is that they don‟t request, they 
demand for these increases and they always want to have meetings… As a one-man 
business I did not have the time, otherwise this would affect my business in a 
negative way. I realised that either I had to sit in meetings with the unions all the time 
or I had to use experts to deal with them because they know how to deal with 
them…since they have been big shots in the trade unions.‟132 
                                               
129
 LaRRI (2006) 21.  
130
 LaRRI (2006) 21. 
131
 In the Mandla case supra 965 the worker was interviewed and accepted by the client before he was employed by the labour 
broker who then had to facilitate the contract of employment, and the remuneration of the worker for a fee. The worker was 
only expected to sign the contract with the broker and told that he would be working as an independent contractor, which 
means exclusion from the protection under the definition of employee in terms of the LRA (s 213). 
132
 LaRRI (2006) 22. 
 
 
 
 
40 
 
 
With regards to complying with any relevant collective agreement mentioned in “a discreet 
section of the LRA”, Theron remarks that „a strong system of centralised bargaining failed to 
materialise‟ 133 . So in these circumstances the other provisions regarding labour-
broking...became an open invitation to employers to escape [their] own prescriptions‟ with 
regard to the collective agreements to which they would have been bound.134 
 
g) Reducing the impact of strikes 
 
Several companies indicated that they started using labour broking workers following a strike 
by permanent workers. A retail manager pointed out that: 
 
 „After an illegal strike, we decided to bring in the labour broking services so that it 
spreads the risks if ever there would be another strike. If the permanent staff went on 
strike, we could still continue with the labour broking staff.‟135 
 
From the above discussed reasons, one cannot over look the fact that some of the 
expressed views and comments are against the spirit of sound labour relations promoted in 
the labour acts. For example, some companies stated that when hiring labour brokers they 
cut costs by not providing benefits and not paying the employees when they are on leave. 
More worrying is the fact that some executives confirmed the alarming dismissal rates in 
respect of labour broking employees by stating that the labour broking option allowed them 
to send back non-performing workers and demand hardworking replacements.  To make 
matters worse, those executives appreciate the fact that usually no disciplinary hearing is 
instituted for workers dismissed in the labour broking contract. However, the view causing 
the most concern which is derived from LaRRI and DoL studies on why companies engaged 
labour brokers, centres around that they hope to avoid trade unions.136  The executives 
pointed out that with labour broking they can engage employees in vulnerable positions 
when negotiating conditions of employment. These practices are against the spirit of 
collective bargaining and the employees‟ constitutional freedom of association.137  
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CHAPTER 4 
 
EXPLOITIVE WORKING CONDITIONS  
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
With the emergence of labour brokers, some quarters of society led by trade unions have 
argued that not since the era of apartheid have exploitive conditions of this kind been 
observed in the South African and Namibian labour markets. Trade unions argue that labour 
broking practices have reversed all labour relations and working condition successes 
achieved through the liberation struggles. The comparison is that, just like the previous 
exploitive labour systems under apartheid, today labour brokers erode opportunities for 
social justice and fair treatment. Thus, unions have called for stricter labour policies to 
ensure the full protection of these workers. Some of the concerns raised by the union 
movements for policy revision to re-examine the legality of labour brokers for following 
exploitive employment conditions, relate to the denial of collective bargaining and the 
dismissal rates. They point out that labour broking employment contracts are often 
terminated as soon as the commercial contract between the labour broker and its client 
ends. “On the spot” retrenchments are a regular occurrence. In addition, unions state that 
these workers often face long periods of uncertainty in employment as they are constantly 
vulnerable to both substantively and procedurally unfair terminations. Plus they argue that 
apart from the employees having no job security, most are employed on the basis of “no 
work – no pay”.  
 
Other expressed concerns regarding the exploitative nature of labour brokers include a lack 
of training on health and safety procedures and poor wages far below that of permanent 
workers performing the same duties. Labour broking employees are usually only provided 
with basic benefits required by law, such as, workmen‟s compensation and social security, 
while other general social benefits, such as, pension fund contributions or medical aid cover 
are totally denied.  
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4.2 Ongoing Concerns  
 
The LaRRI study of 2006 confirmed that the biggest problems experienced by labour broking 
employees were the lack of benefits, low wages and job insecurity. Because of the exclusion 
of triangular relationships in the initial definition of an employee, existing Labour Acts in both 
South Africa and Namibia have impacted very little on the working conditions of labour 
broker workers and have failed to grant these workers protection against abuses.  The study 
further points out that the majority of labour brokers are usually aware of the basic conditions 
of employment set out in the labour legislation of the country and will claim to adhere to them 
by, for example, registering employees for social security and workmen‟s compensation 
benefits.138 However, the widespread practice is that most labour brokers will often engage 
labour consultants to advise them on the minimum requirements and try to ensure that those 
are met cost-effectively.  Generally, employment conditions for labour broker employees at 
most times are of an exploitive nature as „many do not receive any paid leaves or severance 
payouts in case of retrenchment‟ 139 . All this exploitive conditions can only be really 
addressed with a sound regulatory law framework, clearly detailing the basic conditions of 
employment in the industry.  
 
But the most alarming and regulatory challenging observation in the operation of labour 
brokers over recent years has been a drastic strategy by some companies to convert more 
and more solid jobs to those of contracts under labour brokers. 
 
According to the LaRRI report „the use of labour brokers ... is not limited to peak periods and 
specific tasks only. Over the past few years, labour broking has become an established 
practice and in some instances permanent workers were retrenched [to avoid legislative 
requirements] and replaced by those of labour broking companies‟140.   
 
 
4.3 Inadequate Responsibility 
 
Being some of the most unskilled and semi-skilled groups in the labour market, many labour 
broking workers in the Grabouw case study expressed an interest in further training. 141 They 
saw training as an opportunity to acquire further competency in the jobs and to reduce 
termination by reason of incapacity or workplace injuries. However, many labour brokers and 
client companies fail to facilitate any sort of training for their employees, and when workers 
fail to achieve targets or suffer injuries on duty; they are instantly dismissed and replaced. 
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This lack of training of labour broking employees is often complicated by the continued 
existence of confusion amongst the workers on whose shoulders this responsibility should 
fall. Because some of the workers perceive themselves as employees of the client 
companies whilst they are actually employed by the labour broking business.142  This is 
mainly because the relationship between workers and a client company is not always clear. 
To illustrate the confusion around who should be responsible for training the employees in a 
labour broking system, a Grabouw case study is examined. Some workers were interviewed 
and most of them were almost unanimous in acknowledging the labour broker as their 
employer, but the majority believed that it was the responsibility of the client company to 
provide training to workers.  The main reason cited for the client company bearing the 
responsibility for training was the perception that the workers‟ employers (brokers) would not 
be able to afford to pay them salaries and to provide training; the workers argued that „...farm 
owners have enough money to provide training‟143. However since the current Labour laws 
only recognise the broker as the employer, the responsibility for training should rest with the 
labour broking entity.  
 
In response to the same question, most labour brokers in the case study saw the training of 
workers as their responsibility and not that of the client companies. 144 However, many stated 
that the seasons they are hired for were usually very busy and there was therefore no time 
available to train workers. A small group of labour brokers believed that there was no 
responsibility for anyone to provide training to “temporary workers”. This finding again 
confirms the confusion regarding roles and responsibilities between labour brokers and client 
companies in relation to workers. This in turn has weakened the workers‟ ability to claim their 
rights. 
 
When asked about their knowledge of labour rights, all the workers who were interviewed in 
the Grabouw case study indicated that they did not know their labour rights and had never 
received any form of training about their labour rights: „We don‟t know our rights, but we 
really want to know our rights, so that we can also talk about our problems.‟145 At the same 
time they expressed scepticism about whether this would make an objective difference to 
their circumstances given their weak bargaining position as contract workers. In the words of 
one worker respondent: „It [knowledge of our labour rights] will not help us because we will 
be too scared to use the knowledge. We just go if they chase us away..‟ 146.  But if labour 
broking is to continue to operate in South Africa and Namibia, the regulatory frameworks on 
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the industry should compel both brokers and clients to provide adequate training to the 
employees both in terms of the scope of work and access to union representation. 
 
4.4 High Job Insecurity 
 
According to s185 of the LRA „every employee has the right not to be unfairly dismissed‟.  
The LRA in ss186-194 lays down guidelines to be followed when any terminations are 
initiated between an employer and employee, in ss186-194, while ss29-37 of the NLA give 
the same protection in respect of Namibian labour operations. However, Jauch in his labour 
broking publication titled Namibia‟s Labour Hire Debate in Perspective states that, although 
in theory the existing labour provisions on employment termination apply to labour broking 
companies as well, the usual practice is to hire and dismiss workers at will without following 
any legislation provided procedure.147  He points out that client companies can request the 
removal of any of the labour broker‟s workers at any time without giving the employee the 
prescribed period of notice required on termination of all employment relationships. The 
labour company will then have to send a replacement. Benjamin adds that the client's 
decision to request an agency to withdraw an employee is conveyed from client to agency in 
terms of their commercial arrangement and therefore falls beyond the reach of labour law.148 
Thus, new labour law reforms relating to labour brokers could succeed in regulating how 
these employers deal with those employees that are unwanted by clients-possibly along the 
lines of the current procedures on retrenchments. 
 
According to van Niekerk & Linstrom, whatever security of employment exists between the 
labour broker and its employees is largely dependent on the terms of the contract between 
them.149 They further add that agreements of this nature typically provide that the labour 
broker offers work only for the duration of a particular assignment. However, even when this 
condition is expressed, the work period of the employee is not guaranteed as was the case 
in Dick v Cozens Recruitment Services150. The client can request the removal at any time. In 
this case the CCMA Commissioner held that were there was no intention by the broker to 
supply the employee with actual employment other than through the assignment taking place 
with the client.  The period of fictional employment with the client could only be intended to 
coincide with the period of the commercial agreement with the client.  Thus the labour broker 
is not obliged to place the employee in alternative employment when a client terminates an 
assignment. 
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Companies who engage labour brokers often argue that labour broking is the “flexible” 
option to “substitute” employees who are judged to be underperforming for reasons, such as, 
incapacity, misconduct, absenteeism and wild strike actions. However the nature of labour 
broking terminations has contributed to the “commodification” of labour as an easily 
exchangeable and replaceable commodity.151  However, recently arbitrators have initiated 
steps to stop these conspicuous dismissals in labour broking employment matters. In Molusi 
and Ngisiza Bonke Manpower Services CC152, a South African case, a broker and client 
refused to allow an employee to resume work after maternity leave which amounted to clear 
unfair dismissal.153 Shortly after the appellant, Ms Molusi, was placed with a client company 
as a data capturer, she took maternity leave. Upon her return to resume duty, the labour 
broker gave her a month‟s notice because, so it said, the client company had done some 
restructuring and no longer required her services.  As with many other cases, the labour 
broker, Ngisiza Bonke Manpower, claimed that Ms Molusi‟s dismissal was perfectly fair 
because she was aware all along that her employment was linked to the client‟s needs. The 
CCMA Commissioner disagreed. He ruled that if this were so, both the client and the labour 
broker could simply disregard the provisions of the BCEA and the employee‟s constitutional 
right to „fair labour practices‟154.   The Commissioner ruled that the labour broker, Ngisiza 
Bonke Manpower, had simply chosen to “wash its hands of the employee”. However, under 
the normal circumstances of a standard employment relationship,[to let go of the employee] 
the client employer would have been required to follow  retrenchment procedures, and the 
broker as the employer should have taken over this duty. Thus Ms Molusi was awarded 
compensation. 
 
However, without a clear labour broking regulatory framework, one South African case still 
proves the inconsistency and the difficulty arbitrators have in dealing with terminations of 
unprotected employees.  In NUMSA obo Fortuin & Others and Laborie Arbeidsburo155, the 
labour broker undertook to terminate the employment of 14 employees with bad 
absenteeism records at the insistence of a client. The client had given the broker the 
ultimatum to dismiss the employees or risk losing the assignment. Here the arbitrator wrote: 
 
„There are certainly elements of both misconduct and operational requirements when 
considering the reason for the dismissal of these 14 employees. They were told that 
the labour broker had to dismiss them, or lose the whole contract. The situation is 
complicated by the fact that the client company was obviously concerned with the 
employees‟ conduct however, the labour broker was more concerned about ensuring 
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the continuity of the contract. Thus the broker chose to tell them that the reason why 
they were being dismissed was because they had poor absenteeism records.‟156 
 
In Laborie Arbeidsburo, the arbitrator‟s solution was to prescribe both the procedures for 
misconduct and for operational requirements. In the circumstances, he said, the labour 
broker should first have investigated whether the client‟s complaint was valid, and if so, 
dismissed the employees for misconduct. If the client„s complaint had proved incorrect, the 
labour broker could have commenced consultations for retrenchments. As it happened the 
broker did neither; it simply accepted the client‟s word and dismissed the employees without 
informing them of the reason. To make matters worse, because the labour broker failed to 
find alternative positions for the employees, the circumstances of this case founded claims 
for constructive dismissals.157  
 
Van Eck stresses that „so long as the person placed is not deemed to be a worker of the 
client but rather of the labour broker, the CCMA and the Labour Court do not have 
jurisdiction to consider disputes in respect of unfair dismissal and unfair labour practice 
disputes between the client and the worker‟158. In addition, he mentions that the contract 
between the labour broker and the worker is often made subject to the continuation of the 
commercial contract between the labour broker and the client. In instances where this has 
been explicitly agreed upon, the courts have confirmed that the termination of the contract of 
employment on grounds that the client has terminated the commercial contract with the 
labour broker does not constitute dismissal at all.159  According to Van Eck, the effect of this 
is that if the termination does not constitute dismissal, a dispute about an unfair dismissal 
cannot be referred to the CCMA, and the employee is left without remedy even though the 
circumstances may be grossly unfair.160 
 
4.5 The Employment on „Fixed Contract‟ Concept 
 
Usually fixed-term contracts are appropriately used for work on projects of limited duration 
such as construction projects. However Benjamin in his publication entitled Decent  Work 
and Non-standard employees: Option for legislative reform in South Africa, points out that 
the absence of any requirement that fixed-term contracts must be for an appropriate purpose 
has allowed widespread use to be made of fixed-term contracts in many sectors for what is 
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in effect indefinite employment. 161  In the current legal vacuum, although the word 
“temporary” is used to refer to the operations of labour brokers, „there is no clear statutory 
restriction on the duration of labour brokerage arrangements‟162. The durations of these 
employment relationships are simply dependent on the length of the commercial contract 
between the broker and the client, which could be the arrival of an agreed date or purpose. 
After this said date or purpose the employee no longer has a contract and will not be 
required for the activities of the business.   Thus, the contact between the employee and 
labour broker will also terminate automatically. In one of the contracts that the LaRRI Study 
came across, it was stated that:  
 
„In the event of the client terminating their contract with the company [labour broker] 
or our company terminating their contract with the client, or the client wishing to 
discontinue your services, for whatever reason, your services with regard to this 
contract will be terminated. 163 ‟ Furthermore „it is specifically recorded that upon 
termination of this [employment] agreement, that said termination, for whatever 
reason, cannot be construed as being a retrenchment and/or dismissal‟164. 
 
Thus, contract terminations are usually not consensual, and more worrying, very few 
retrenchments provisions are followed as per Labour law procedures on how to end the 
contract.  The provision of full labour protection for labour broker employees under the 
existing laws, will allow labour broking employees to seek compensation from the courts and 
tribunals for the many unfair contract terminations. However, under the current position of 
labour laws in South Africa and Namibia, the majority of such cases go unprosecuted and 
leave many citizens without any severance pay, impoverished, and on the streets.  
 
However, in certain cases even if the commercial contract between the broker and one client 
comes to an end or the client has asked for the employee to be replaced, the worker‟s 
employment contract with the labour company can still continue elsewhere with a different 
client. This re-assigning of the employee to a different client does not qualify as a contract 
termination. Grogan, in his book Dismissal, emphasised that in the absence of a contractual 
provision to that effect, the mere fact that a broker‟s client insists that a particular employee 
be removed from the project for which he is engaged does not automatically terminate the 
contract.165  He points out that the broker should completely dismiss the employee from duty 
before they can claim for unfair contract termination. 166  This position was supported by the 
Labour Court in Colven Associates Border CC v Metal & Engineering Industries Bargaining 
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Council & Others.167  In this case, a client of the labour broker, Colven Associates Border 
CC, insisted that a respondent employee be removed from its premises after he was 
involved in a fight. The broker‟s commercial contract with the client obliged it to do so. The 
broker duly informed the employee that he was not to report to the client company‟s 
premises, but notified him that he was not dismissed. The employee disappeared, and later 
claimed to have been unfairly dismissed by the labour broker.  He succeeded in the CCMA 
and was re-instated. However, the Labour Court found that the Commissioner had 
misdirected his inquiry as regards to the circumstances that gave rise to the employee‟s 
removal from the client‟s premises.  The employee was employed by the broker; therefore 
the proper inquiry was whether the labour broker had dismissed him. The court found that 
the Commissioner had overlooked this fact, and should have found that the labour broker 
had informed the employee that his removal from the client company‟s premises did not 
mean that he was dismissed. Thus the earlier award by the Commissioner was set aside. 
 
 In the LaRRI Report on labour brokers published in Namibia, several of the labour broking 
employment contracts that were collected during that study on the Namibian situation in 
2006 contain some dubious clauses that openly violate the provisions of the Labour Act. For 
example, one contract states that once the worker‟s contract with the labour broking 
company is terminated “for whatever reason”, he or she may not accept employment at any 
of the labour broker‟s client companies for a period of six months. The contract further states 
that, „should the employee break this condition, the employee accepts all costs that would 
have been charged to the client, i.e. a placement fee at 15% of the employees annual salary, 
as well as all legal costs incurred to enforce this condition‟168. This clause certainly aims to 
prevent those labour broking employees that are dismissed, whether fairly or unfairly, from 
obtaining permanent employment at a client company under different circumstances.169  
Furthermore, in the same contracts, LaRRI found a clause that requires employees to agree 
„to undergo a polygraph test, whenever there is an allegation of theft and/or fraud‟170 , which 
is not a legal measure relating to fair trial and procedure. The contracts also stipulate that 
„the employee indemnifies any of the employer‟s clients against any claims which may be 
made against it under the Compensation of Occupational Injuries and Diseases Act‟. In 
some cases labour companies issue their staff with contracts that state that those workers 
receive „three consecutive paid off days after every completed month including work on 
holidays‟171. In other words, workers work every single day for a full month and then receive 
three days off. This is a blatant violation of the labour law but constitutes standard practice 
as confirmed by one labour broker, its clients and the workers. Some contracts further state 
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that the industry requires a seven day week and that the employee shall therefore work 
seven days a week, unless otherwise directed. While „overtime payments are included in the 
basic salary172, the common practice is that workers have to work for 9 – 12 hours every day 
at a fixed remuneration per day, no matter how much overtime the labour broking workers 
have done its never paid which is illegal and unlawful.  
 
Benjamin stresses that „effective regulation is a feasible approach to preventing abusive 
practices and exploitation associated with labour broking by limiting the sectors and types of 
work for which employees can be contracted‟173.  He stresses that were this approach to be 
adopted, labour brokers could be permitted to place workers in categories of work that are 
by their nature 'temporary' or of limited duration.  According to him, these include workers 
engaged – 
 
(a)   on short-term contracts of a specified duration; 
(b)   as substitutes for employees when workers are absent due to illness, vacation, training 
or leave; 
(c)   for short periods to meet fluctuations in demand for labour or to cope with emergency 
provisions.174 
Benjamin concludes that this type of regulation would permit those employees who desire 
this sort of flexibility, to work on an ongoing (if not regular) basis by performing a series of 
short-term placements.175 
 
4.6 Necessary Employment Creation or Not 
 
According to Hutchinson and Le Roux, although workers face the possibility of being 
exploited either by the labour broker or the client of the labour broker, it is still a better option 
from an unemployed person‟s perspective to be part of a tripartite employment relationship 
than to face a day without the possibility of earning an income.176  They point out that every 
person needs an opportunity to earn a living and add dignity to his or her life. The 
development of a person‟s skills and abilities contributes to the physical and mental 
wellbeing of that person and his or her dependants. Social recognition and human dignity 
are values closely linked to a person‟s perception of worth and self-worth.177 Gericke adds 
that every society needs a system that is responsible for the creation of jobs and has the 
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development of skills as its highest priority. It is in this regard that the role played by a labour 
broker has become extremely valuable. He says that in this regard labour brokers fulfil a 
major role of ensuring bread on the table for millions. 178 
 
In the groundbreaking 2006 LaRRI study it was found that the vast majority of the work 
created by the operations of labour brokers is usually that of manual labourers, shelf 
packers, cashiers, merchandisers, machine operators, bakers, drivers, etc which are usually 
temporary. 179  More significantly, the study found that „increasingly this includes mostly 
desperate young people who completed school but were unable to find permanent jobs 
elsewhere‟180. The only real meaningful employment creation effect of labour brokers is very 
limited as almost all jobs are created by the client companies. Normally only a limited 
number of administrative and supervisory staffs are employed on a permanent basis with full 
benefits by labour broking companies. However, on the other hand, some client companies 
indicated that they would probably have employed fewer workers if the labour broking option 
were not open to them.181 
 
Most recent labour brokers describe themselves as black economic empowerment business 
that aim to empower previously disadvantaged groups to derive greater benefit from national 
economies and to correct previous wealth inequalities. However, according to the study by 
the LaRRI most labour broking businesses contribute little to socio-economic development, 
equality and social justice.  They merely create business opportunities and profits for a small 
group of owners and managers, leaving the majority of the workforce in further poverty as 
result of lower wages and poor working conditions. Thus the price for labour broking 
practices is paid by the workers directly affected.  
 
As further observed by the 2006 LARRI study, labour broking employment is hardly a 
springboard to permanent jobs. Indications were that very few labour broking workers were 
eventually taken over by client companies as permanent staff.182  One labour broker in 
Namibia explicitly prevents its workers from taking up employment at any client company 
even well after the brokerage contract has lapsed.  
 
In fact, according to the Report published by the LaRRI in 2006, „over the past few years, 
labour broking has become an established practice and in some instances permanent 
workers were retrenched and referred for recruitment under a labour broker often doing the 
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same work but at lower wages and benefits. The argument is thus that labour brokers pose a 
serious threat to permanent jobs, especially in the lower skills categories.  
 
Interestingly, some labour broking businesses have claimed that any abolition of labour 
broking would lead to thousands of job losses. 183  However Jauch points out that „this 
argument is based on the assumption that client companies will reduce their operations and 
pursuit of profits if they cannot use labour brokers any longer‟184.  According to Jauch, this is 
debatable. He points out that what seems certain is that labour brokers themselves are not 
job creators and therefore make a very limited contribution to Namibia‟s development and 
the creation of decent work. 
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CHAPTER 5 
 
UNIONISATION IN LABOUR BROKING 
 
5.1 Introduction 
The emergence of non-standard employment in the new global economy is attributed to the 
shift of the balance of power from employees back to the employers‟ advantage in 
employment relationships.185 But even before the rise of the old economy in pre-democracy 
Namibia and South Africa, employment relationships centred on the forced labour of the vast 
majority of the population.  Workers‟ rights suffered severely at the hands of apartheid 
policies and discriminatory regulations which gave all the power to minority group employers. 
Eventually it triggered dramatic increases in trade union movements and their membership.  
Most trade unions at the time served as solidarity, struggle organizations for aggrieved 
workers, especially those from the black population, that were deliberately discriminated 
against in order to create a cheap labour class.  
 
However, according to Sweet & Meiksins unions in the new economy of globalisation are 
finding it more and more difficult to attract new members.186 Analysts have suggested that 
the decline in union membership indicates that the new economy has resulted in a changed 
relationship between employers and employees for the better, as a result of which 
management philosophies and new forms of work organizations ostensibly promote 
collaboration and harmony between employers and their workers. In this culture of co-
operation, traditional unions are not attractive to workers, who often see them as threatening 
the company‟s interests and their jobs.187 For developing countries, such as, South Africa 
and Namibia, the decline in unionisation has occurred simultaneously with the declining 
wage and job security levels. Unions find it particularly very difficult to gain membership in 
the flexible non-standard employment practices of the new global economy. For example, in 
respect of labour broking workers, this is difficult because those workers are less likely to 
devote their entire careers to a single job. Labour broking employees are not only vulnerable 
to abrupt employment terminations, but often find themselves in different industries in a short 
space of time. This chapter discusses more in detail the difficulties that trade unions 
encounter in the trying to organise labour broking workers in the changing working patterns 
presented by the new economy and new organisational practices.  
 
                                               
185
 Sweet S & Meiksins P Changing Contours of Work- Jobs and Opportunities in the New Economy (2008) 32. 
186
Sweet S & Meiksins (2008) 33.   
187
 Sweet S & Meiskins P (2008) 34 
 
 
 
 
53 
 
 
5.2 The Current Position of Trade Unions 
  
The major trade unions in Namibia and South Africa are radically opposed to labour brokers. 
They consider their operations as an attack on labour relation successes achieved since the 
days of the struggle against the apartheid contract – labour systems, like the South West 
Africa Native Labour Association (SWANLA) and other exploitive policies. Unions are 
particularly concerned that the option of labour brokers has allowed companies to drop the 
basic standards of employment conditions to poverty levels by retrenching permanent 
workers and re-hiring them through the operations of labour brokers at half salaries and 
reduced benefits. 
 
In his unpublished paper, entitled Temporary Employment Services in South Africa and 
Namibia, Van Eck discusses that the leading trade union federations, namely the Congress 
of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) and the National Council of Trade Unions 
(NACTU), have confirmed that they are in favour of a legislative ban on labour broking.188 In 
Namibia, since the practice of labour broking emerged in the late 1990s, the biggest union 
umbrella body, the National Union of Namibian Workers (NUNW), has organised a number 
of country wide demonstrations against labour broker. They are also particularly against the 
alarming rate at which permanent workers were being retrenched just to be re-employed as  
a labour broker‟s workers under more reduced and extreme conditions. The then NUNW 
Secretary-General, Ranga Haikali, stated in year 2000 during one such demonstration that: 
 
„Labour Broking Companies remind us of the contract labour system under which Namibian 
workers suffered before independence. Our memories are still fresh about the role SWANLA 
played in upholding an unjust and exploitative system and we seem to allow a revival in the 
form of Labour Brokers. We need to take stock of the goals we set ourselves during the 
liberation struggle and of the rights and freedoms brought about by our independence. Are 
these goals and achievements cherished or are we beginning to undermine and destroy 
them? Are we moving forward as a free people in a free country or are we moving backwards. 
We need to realise our historical responsibility for the destiny of our country, the destiny of our 
people and the destiny of future generations.‟
189
  
  
The union movements in both countries have thus continuously demanded that government 
and national lawmakers initiate steps abolish labour brokers.  They have suggested that the 
national departments of labour should rather provide public employment services to 
companies looking for temporary and flexible workers, to stop exploitation by greedy 
individuals.  
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5.3 To Organise or Not to Organise 
 
Since their emergence, union movements in both South Africa and Namibia have found it 
extremely challenging to represent the rights of labour broking employees. This sector is 
often characterised by poor levels of union representation and collective bargaining 
campaigns.  The low levels of representation can be attributed to the fact that unions find it 
difficult to organise labour broking workers for a number of reasons. According to Hall, 
labour broking workers often have relatively inconsistent work histories and non-standard 
work patterns.190  This makes it difficult for unions to be able to identify and approach 
potential members and to detect likely breaches of labour conditions. He points out that this 
has also played a significant role in discouraging unions from organising labour broking 
workers. The unions argue that these workers are not in permanent continuous employment 
and thus would not be able to pay their membership fees on a continuous basis like 
permanent workers. 191  Some unions have even refused to recorgnise labour broking 
workers as they perceive them as a threat to their existing members‟ jobs. 
 
According to the 2006 LaRRI Study, due to the lack of protection and the precarious nature 
of labour broking work, workers are often afraid to inform unions about the labour company‟s 
or the client company‟s rights violations.192  The Report states that the workers are usually 
afraid of losing their jobs and of not being assigned new jobs. The Report also points out that 
another common reason for low levels of representation among labour broking workers is 
that they have no time to visit union offices due to long working hours. The only time 
available is in the evenings, and in most cases union offices only operate during office hours. 
The workers get paid only for the actual hours worked and taking time off during the day to 
go to the union offices results in a loss of income; thus it makes going there practically 
impossible.193 
 
Anderson et al argued that of all workers in non-standard forms of employment, labour 
broking workers are worse off than even casual workers as they have a very minimal chance 
to establish a relationship within the workplace setting.194 Anderson et al point out that labour 
broker employees are continuously moved between different work stations for short periods. 
They are often perceived by permanent workers as a threat and labelled as “low status 
workers”, carrying out low-skill casual work and being used as “scab labour” during strikes. 
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Thus, permanent workers do not identify with labour broking employees, which makes the 
formation of relationships and the creation of solidarity almost impossible.195 
 
 
5.4 Difficulty in Categorisation 
 
The process to organise labour broker employees for collective bargaining purposes has 
proved to be difficult in circumstances where a worker‟s job performed at a client and the 
industry sector for labour brokers each are associated with a different union. Benjamin, in his 
publication Decent work and non-standard employees, states that in theory these employees 
should affiliate and bargain for their rights through the union guarding the industry where the 
broker, who is deemed to be their employer, carries out business but in practice this has 
prove to be difficult as the employees usually have very little contact with the broker.  
 
The other significant difficulty in organise labour broking employees under trade unions is 
that the operations of a labour broker are not restricted to one industry thus it can be found 
that a broker will provide for example a certain driver this month to a client in the mining 
industry and the next month this driver is placed with a client in the food and retail industry.  
From month to month, the difficulty will exist for this driver whether to affiliate to the union 
guarding the mining industry were he is for one month or join the union guarding the food 
and retail industry knowing that next month he could be in another industry. This type‟s 
difficulty leaves most workers under labour brokers to remain without union representation. 
But since employees are legally only in an employment relationship with the broker and not 
with the client company where they perform their services, industry categorisation at most 
times is unclear. The difficulty arises particularly around the question: whether to affiliate the 
labour workers to the union in the sector of the client employer where they actually do the 
work or to affiliate to specific labour broking service unions.196   
 
This difficulty was raised in Workforce Group Holdings (Pty) Ltd and National  Bargaining 
Council for the  Road Freight Industry197 , where the applicant (labour broker) supplied 
employees to clients in various  industries, including some drivers to two clients involved in 
transporting goods. Although the provision of drivers to these clients only made up about 8 
per cent of its total operations, the labour broker registered with the respondent council. The 
labour broker then sought deregistration on the basis that it was involved in the services 
sector and that it was associated with its employees, not for purposes of road transportation, 
but to provide various services to clients.  In his judgement, the CCMA Commissioner 
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rejected the labour broker‟s argument. He found that employees did not perform work for the 
broker but for the clients.  There was accordingly no „joint association‟ with a common 
purpose; each employee rather forms a separate association depending on the assignment 
to perform particular duties a client. The Workforce Group accordingly remained registered 
with the road freight industry council. 
 
However, if workers are affiliate to the work and operation of the client company, as the 
Commissioner indicated in Workforce Group Holdings, what happens to their union 
membership when they are moved to a new client in a different industry? Thus, as result of 
demarcation difficulties, a large number of labour broking employees are usually not able to 
exercise any bargaining power and are not organised, and as a results are exposed to 
increased vulnerability, including arbitrary dismissals. They are also unable to participate in 
workplace negotiations over, such as, of salary increments, better working conditions and 
benefits.198 Benjamin stresses that with effective regulation employees placed by labour 
brokers should be able to exercise their rights to acquire organisational rights and engage in 
collective bargaining with either the labour broker or the client for whom they work. Such a 
result can be achieved by amending the definition of 'workplace' to take into account the 
nature of labour broking.199 
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CHAPTER 6 
 
TOTAL BAN OR FLEXIBLE REGULATION 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
Prior to the political developments of 1990 and 1994, international standards played a very 
small role in influencing labour law policies in Namibia and South Africa. This is largely due 
to the heavy international sanctions that were placed on the apartheid government for its 
discriminatory and unfair practices that were widely criticised by the global community.  
However, under the new political dispensation, the isolation of local labour markets is no 
longer the case.  Labour law policies in both countries can no longer be developed without 
recognition of global labour standards, such as those advocated by the International Labour 
Organisation (ILO) under section 3.5 of this paper, primarily because, like other developing 
countries, both South Africa and Namibia have a keen interest in world trade. In addition 
both countries have made room to recognise international laws and agreements under 
section 29 and section 233 of the South African Constitution and article 144 of the Namibia 
Constitution.  
 
Thus, as members of the ILO, all the labour laws since the rise of democracy in South Africa 
and Namibia have strongly integrated the conventions and decent standards of the ILO as 
an important source of customary international law.200  The importance of this international 
impact was highlighted in the ongoing Namibian debate on whether to totally ban labour 
brokers or rather put in place meaningful regulations, specifically in the African Personnel 
Services v Government of the Republic of Namibia201 case.     
 
This chapter will examine the recent attempts to ban brokers that were initiated in Namibia 
leading to the two landmark rulings of the High Court and the Supreme Court of Appeal. 
Lastly, some possible measures will be suggested that labour law in South Africa and 
Namibia can follow to put in place sound regulations that both protect worker‟s rights and 
provide business enterprises with room to undertake flexible employment options to keep 
with global competitive demands.   
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6.2 The 2007 Ban in Namibia 
 
Namibian parliamentarians in 2007 initiated steps to completely ban the operations of labour 
brokers. This was largely because of growing pressures from union movements as a result 
of the ruling party SWAPO‟s alliance with the NUNW from days of the struggle against 
apartheid. They agreed that similarities existed between the working conditions of labour 
brokers and those which existed under the apartheid contract labour systems, specifically 
concerning the low protection level of workers‟ rights and the no-compliance with the ILO‟s 
decent work standards. Subsequently, the Namibian Labour Act 11 of 2007 was passed in 
this regard. Section 128 (1) prohibited labour brokers in the following terms: „No person may, 
for reward, employ any person with a view to making that person available to a third party to 
perform work for the third party‟. According to Nghishililwa, rather than on legal on grounds, 
parliament sought to justify the prohibition of labour brokers on the ground that the practice 
was against public policy (contra bonis mores) because “it offended decency and morality” of 
employment conditions. He argued that the law does not recognize and define nations of 
decency and morality even though no one would wish to support a system that is oppressive 
and exploitive.  
 
However, even if there is a rational connection between the prohibition of labour brokers and 
the permissible objectives of morality and decency as reasonable reasons for the restriction 
of freedoms and rights, the courts had to be satisfied that such restrictions were legal. In 
other words, the restrictions had to be limited to what was constitutionally necessary to 
achieve the objective.202 
 
Subsequently, the banning of labour brokers by the new Labour Act of 2007 led to a 
confrontation in the Namibian courts between two schools of thought: one that validated the 
ban for reasons of “offending decency and morality”, and the other contesting going for the 
actual legality of the ban in terms of the constitutional “right to engage in business, trade or 
profession of choice”.  
 
6.2. 1 High Court Judgement 
 
The first significant development shortly after the coming into operation of the new Labour 
Act in 2007, was an interdict filed in the High Court by one of the biggest labour companies 
in the country, African Personnel Services (APS)203. APS was arguing that s128, which 
prohibits labour hire, undermined its constitutional right to do business. 
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The Africa Personnel Services (Pty) Ltd and others v Government of the Republic of 
Namibia204case  was heard 24 and 25 November 2008, and pitted APS and the Namibia 
Employers Federation (NEF) against the government and trade unions.  The first applicant, 
APS, a specialist labour company providing employees for various clients and businesses, 
challenged the constitutionality of s128 of the new Labour Act, and specifically on the basis 
of the Namibian Constitution which provides that all persons have the right to „practise any 
profession, or carry on any occupation, trade or businesses‟ 205 . A similar provision is 
contained in 22 of the South African Constitution.206 
 
Three judges delivered a unanimous verdict on 1 December 2008. They found that „labour 
brokers are not lawful in Namibia because it has no legal basis in Namibian law‟207. The 
judges justified this view on the basis that contracts of employment are based on Roman law 
when they involve „the letting or hiring of personal services in return for monetary return‟ 
between two parties only. The judges further argued that Roman law only recognised slavery 
of persons who are not Roman citizens and therefore such persons (slaves) could be hired 
or rented to another person for whom the slaves performed a personal service. However, 
they stressed that Namibia follows the Roman law traditions through its historical 
connections to South Africa and its Roman-Dutch law definition of a standard contract of 
employment. Thus, they emphasised that the hiring or renting out of employees to another 
person for reward falls outside the law of contract of employment in Namibia and smacks of 
the hiring of a slave by his slave-master to another person.  
 
The court thus found that there was no law in Namibia under which labour brokers could 
enter into a contract of employment with persons and then hire them for reward to third 
parties. The judges concluded that labour broking „has no legal basis at all in Namibian law, 
and, therefore, is not lawful‟208. Furthermore, the court found that labour broking violates a 
fundamental principle on which the ILO is based, namely, that „labour is not a commodity‟209. 
Thus, the three judges of the High Court found that labour brokers are not lawful in Namibia 
and that s128 of the new Labour Act should be enforced by the respondent, the Namibian 
government. 
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6.2.2 Supreme Court of Appeal (SCA) Judgement 
  
APS launched an appeal in the Supreme Court of Appeal of Namibia shortly after the ruling 
of the High Court.174 The case was heard on 3 March 2009. APS argued that s128 of the 
Labour Act which „prohibits third-party employment‟ was unconstitutional as it encroached on 
its right to „practise any profession, or carry on any occupation, trade or business‟ as set out 
in Article 21 (1) (j) of the Constitution of the Republic of Namibia. 
 
On 14 December 2009, a full bench210 of the SCA delivered a judgement in favour of the 
applicant APS. The first question the court had to answer was: Whether the right envisaged 
in Art 21(1) (j) of the Namibian Constitution applied to juristic persons.211 The court relied on 
a broad interpretation of this Article and, more specifically, on Chapter 3 of the Constitution, 
which grants subjects the full measure of the rights set out therein, and this found no reason 
to limit the words “All persons” in Art 21 (1) (j) to natural persons. The appellant APS, as an 
aggrieved person, had locus standi, the court found. 
 
The court also found that a mere statutory prohibition of an economic activity could not place 
the prohibition beyond the ambit of constitutional review. Thus, the court was obliged to ask 
a second question: Was the statutory limitation of a freedom permissible in terms of Art 
21(2)212 of the Constitution? In this case, the question that needed to be answered was 
whether or not the limitation of the appellant‟s right “to practise any profession, or carry on 
any occupation, trade or business”, as stated in Article 21(1)(j), by the prohibition of labour 
brokers in s128 of the Labour Act could be justified in terms of Art 21(2). Indeed, whether, if 
s128 of the Labour Act were found to be constitutional, it would be impossible for APS to 
proceed with its business. 213 
 
In their arguments, both parties accepted that labour broking or agency work was open to 
abuse by selfish individuals. However, while the applicant APS suggested that the abuses 
could be controlled by regulation, the respondent government and trade unions insisted that 
128 of the Labour Act was a legitimate means to deal with past and possible future abuse. 
 
In giving judgement, the court pondered at length on the differences between the colonial 
migrant worker systems and labour broking operations that exist today.214  He states that the 
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court found that placement agencies (and not labour broking companies) were similar to the 
services provided by SWANLA as they matched “offers of and applications for employment” 
without becoming „a party to the employment relationship that may arise there from‟215.  The 
judges thus argued that unlike the colonial migrant labour agency SWANLA, which acted as 
a link between the contract labourers and their apartheid bosses, labour brokers „employed 
their workers directly and assumed responsibility for their contractual and statutory 
obligations‟216. The judges further found that the contract labour system and labour brokers 
(referred to as “agency work”) „have very little in common under our current constitutional 
dispensation‟217. While not outrightly denying the abuses suffered by labour broking workers 
in Namibia, the judges agreed with the High Court‟s observations that labour broking „evokes 
powerful and painful memories of the abusive contract labour system [SWANLA], which was 
deeply resented by the majority of Namibians‟. However, the judges argued that the 
employment relationship had changed drastically from classical to modern times and thus 
that the situation found in Roman times was no longer applicable today. They also argued 
that workers today entered freely into contracts with labour companies and that freedom of 
contract was not only a matter of public policy but also „a fundamental principle of our law‟.218 
Thus, the judges believed that these gaps could be addressed through regulations and did 
not require an outright ban of labour brokers.  
 
The judges further cited the recent ILO Convention 181 of 1997 on Private Employment 
Agencies219  which recognises the operations of private employment agencies with the need 
for the protection of their workers. The court therefore made the following closing comment: 
 
„Given the scope of regulation contemplated in the 1997-Convention [sic] to facilitate 
agency work and to prevent potential abuses[,] the wide-ranging regulative measures 
introduced in other democratic societies to demarcate the areas of economic activity 
and the categories of employees in relation to which agency work may properly be 
engaged in and the potential to effectively regulate agency work in Namibia without 
compromising the objects of the Act or the legitimate objectives of “decency and 
morality” in Article 21(2) of the Constitution, the blanket prohibition of agency work by 
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s. 128 of the Act substantially overshoots permissible restrictions which, in terms of 
that Sub-Article, may be placed on the exercise of the freedom to carry on any trade 
or business protected under Article 21(1)(j) of the Constitution. The prohibition is 
tailored much wider than that which reasonable restrictions would require for the 
achievement of the same objectives and is disproportionately severe compared to 
what is necessary in a democratic society for those purposes. Even if a generous 
margin of appreciation would be allowed in favour of Parliament, as the respondents 
urge us to do, the unreasonable extent of the prohibition‟s sweep would still fall well 
outside it.‟220 
 
They ruled that “the ILO Convention urged the regulation of agency work not the prohibition 
thereof”.221 Thus the objectives of the new Labour Act could be achieved without a total 
prohibition. 
 
For now, s128 of the Namibian Labour Act of 2007 has been set aside. More significantly 
this case has proved to be a great marker in the ongoing debate whether to outlaw or 
regulate labour brokers, not only in Namibia but also in South Africa.  Any efforts by the 
South African government to reform existing labour laws and totally ban labour brokers, as 
advocated by COSATU, are widely expected to face a similar Constitutional Court challenge 
as that of the African Personnel Services case of Namibia. Thus, South Africa should 
similarly look at a regulatory framework to deal with the operations of labour brokers.222 
 
6.3 Feasibility of Regulation  
 A few years before the Labour Act of 2007 was passed to outlaw brokers, the Namibian 
government circulated its „Guidelines for the Regulation of Labour Hire in Namibia‟ for 
discussion among unions and employers. The Guidelines were initiated in an attempt to 
regulate the labour broking industry under a proposed Labour Act Amendment Bill of 2004. 
However, after some extensive debates between trade unions, employers and the 
government within the framework of the Labour Advisory Council, a final amended set of 
„Proposed Guidelines for Labour Hire and Employment Agencies‟ was presented by the 
Ministry of Labour in August 2000. These Guidelines set out a duty for employment agencies 
to register with the Labour Commissioner and to adhere to the Namibian Constitution, the 
Labour Act, the Company Act and any other Namibian law. Employment agencies are 
required to declare if they render their services free of charge or if they levy a fee on the 
user-enterprise or their workers. 
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In, addition it was proposed that the Labour Commissioner may cancel the registration of 
any employment agency if it contravenes any law or the Guidelines. However, the Minister of 
Labour may grant exemption from the Guidelines as long as the laws are adhered to. More 
significantly, these Guidelines set out minimum hourly wages for labourers, semi-skilled 
workers and skilled workers.223 Also, the proposed regulation required employment agencies 
to register their workers with the Social Security Commission. However, the employment 
agencies were not compelled to provide any additional benefits, as the Guidelines merely 
appealed to such agencies to register their workers with a recognised pension fund „where 
possible‟. 
Furthermore, the Guidelines required employment agencies to design a training programme 
to „uplift industry training skills‟. All workers employed on a „regular basis‟ by an employment 
agency had to be included in the training plan. However, the Guidelines did not spell out 
what constitutes a „regular basis‟. Unless this is clearly defined, employment agencies will 
have the prerogative to decide who will be trained, for what period and in which field. The 
proposed regulations held employment agencies responsible to provide training for their 
workers when they are required to carry out any work „which could threaten their health, 
safety or welfare‟. Furthermore, employment agencies will have to keep records of their 
workers, develop fair and just grievance and disciplinary procedures in line with the Labour 
Act, and promote good labour relations. Employment agencies would also not be allowed to 
participate in any scheme aimed at retrenching workers at client companies and replacing 
them with workers from employment agencies.224 
However, as yet the proposed Guidelines have not been implemented, primarily because the 
trade unions continue to argue that the proposed Guidelines were raising more questions 
than answers.  According to Jauch, amongst the concerns expressed by the labour 
movements about the proposed labour broking regulations was the question of minimum 
conditions of employment, which were left vague.225  In addition, he mentions that the unions 
were concerned that the proposed regulations were silent on the question of permissible 
fees that labour companies could charge.  They further stressed that the Guidelines also 
contained no limitations on the period for which an employee could be treated as a casual 
worker, and thus be subjected to abuse.  The union pressure and concerns led the 
government of the Republic of Namibia to believe that the regulation of labour brokers 
presents more challenges then solutions. The government then followed through and 
initiated the infamous ban under s128 of the Labour Act of 2007, subsequently bringing the 
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SCA to rule that part of the Act „unconstitutional‟ in the landmark judgement in  African 
Personnel Services (Pty) Ltd and otter v Government of the Republic of Namibia. 
 
In South Africa, equal efforts to introduce regulations were initiated in the 1983 amendment 
to the LRA226. However, just as in Namibia, the proposed regulation guidelines requiring 
labour brokers to register were never enforced and were dropped altogether from the post-
democratic new LRA of 1995 that is in operation today. Later, the Skills Development Act of 
1998 again made a further attempt to enforce the registration of labour brokers by requiring 
that an “employment service for gain” be registered. The term was not defined and seemed 
to be wide enough to encompass Temporary Employment Services (TES), which had 
decided that the provision did not apply to them. 
 
Many scholars stress that any attempts by the South African government to existing labour 
legislation and ban labour brokers will face a constitutional challenge similar to that of 
Namibia. The South African government has seriously taken note of those constitutional 
developments in Namibia.  In July 2007, the Minister of Labour, Mildred Oliphant, released 
draft proposed regulations with regard to employment services. 227 Inter alia, the Labour 
Relations Amendment Bill states that „an employee must be employed permanently unless 
the employer can establish justification for employment on fixed term‟. This will limit 
temporary work. The new Bill also abolishes s198 of the LRA, which currently regulates 
labour brokers.228 
 
In addition, as part of the regulation measures, the Basic Conditions of Employment Bill 
makes it a criminal offence for labour broking employers not to pay wages and overtime. 
Similarly, the Employment Equity Amendment Bill will require that labour broking and 
permanent employees receive equal pay be for equal value, with transgressors being 
subjected to penalties based on turnover profits. 
 
In addition, a new law is proposed to further deal with labour broking. The Employment 
Services Bill is meant to register, and regulate the actions of, private employment services 
agencies, personnel agencies, temporary employment services, labour brokers and labour 
recruitment agencies, including their compliance with labour legislation. More significantly, 
however, is that this new Bill provides for the establishment of a Public Employment Agency, 
which „provides recruitment and placement services free of charge229. Many believe these 
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measures are being introduced to make it difficult for labour brokers to continue to operate, 
and to eventually see the services of private brokers becoming redundant by getting direct 
competition from the state.   
 
While back in Namibia, the Minister of Labour, Immanuel Ngatjizeko, whose earlier attempts 
to outlaw the operations of labour broking in the country were blocked by the SCA 
judgement in the African Personnel Services case, tabled an amendment Bill in parliament 
that is widely expected to bring regulation along the lines of those proposed his South 
African counterpart, Ms Oliphant. Speaking to Namibian Broadcasting Corporation(NBC) 
shortly after the 3rd November 2011 tabling of the Bill, Ngatjizeko explained that, amongst 
others, the new Labour Act Amendment Bill of 2011 will make client employers jointly liable 
for conditions of employment of workers placed by labour brokers, including for cases of 
unfair dismissals. 
 
6.4 The New Labour Amendment Laws in Namibian  
 
Some two years following the landmark 2009 SCA judgement in the APS case challenge, 
two pieces of labour laws regulating the operations of labour brokers in Namibia came into 
operation in 2012. 230  The Labour amendment Act No 2 of 2012 and Part 4 of the 
Employment Services Act No. 8 of 2011 came into effect on 1 August 2012 and 1 
September 2012, respectively. These two pieces of legislation, replaces in full, the original 
s128 of the Labour Ac No. 11 of 2007. The original provision made the practice of labour hire 
a crime.  
 
6.4.1 Namibian Labour Amendment Act of 2012  
 
According to a public notice issued by the Ministry of Labour in the New Era Newspaper,231 
under the new s128: 
 Every enterprise (“user enterprise”) that utilises the labour of employees placed by a 
private employment agency, including a labour broker agency, assumes all 
obligations of an employer in terms of the law with respect to the employees; 
 
 Every employee placed by a private employment agency with a user enterprise has 
the same rights and duties in relation to the user enterprise as any other employee in 
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relation to his or her employer, including the guarantee of basic conditions of 
employment, of safety and health at the workplace and protection against unfair 
dismissal; 
 
 Employees placed with a user enterprise shall have the right to join trade unions and 
to bargain collectively with the user enterprise; 
 
 Employees placed by a private employment agency  with a user enterprise shall 
enjoy terms and conditions of employment that are not less favorable than those 
enjoyed by current employees of the  user enterprise who perform the same or 
similar work or work of equal value; 
 
 A user enterprise may not differentiate in employment policies or practices between 
current employees and placed employees; 
 
 A user enterprise may not hire persons through a private employment agency during 
or in contemplation of a strike or lockout or within six months after a retrenchment to 
perform the same or similar work or work of equal value of current or retrenched 
employees; 
 
 To compel both labour brokers and their clients to adhere to the amendments, the 
new act recommends criminal penalties of a maximum fine of $ 80,000 or a 
maximum imprisonment of two years or both have been introduced for violations 
relating to differentiations in wages and employment policies and hiring of such 
employees during or in contemplation of a strike or lockout or within six months after 
a retrenchment; 
 However employers may apply to the Minister for exemption from part of Section 
128. 
 
6.4.2 Namibian Employment Services Act of 2011 
 
In addition, part 4 of the Employment Services Act No. 8 of 2011 and several related 
sections of the Act, came into effect on 1 September 2012. This provision requires that all 
private employment agencies, including labour broking agencies and those that match 
jobseekers and employment vacancies, must obtain a license from the Employment 
Services Bureau of the Ministry of Labour and Social Welfare in order to operate. Private 
employment agencies must file applications for such licenses no later than 28 February 
2013. Additional key features of the new law are:  
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 A private employment agency may not charge fees to employees who it places, nor 
may a user enterprise deduct money from the remuneration of placed employees to 
coup placement fees that it has paid; 
 Several obligations are imposed upon private employment agencies in referring 
employees, including: 
a) Duty not to discriminate in advertising of positions for employment placement 
and in recruitment and referral; 
b) Prohibition against referring employees to user enterprises that has not 
complied with a compliance order issued by labour inspector in terms of the 
Labour Act, 2007 or is not in good standing with respect to Social Security 
contributions or is a designated employer, but is not in possession of a 
certificate of compliance issued by the Social Security Commission;  
c) Obligation not to place individuals with a user enterprise unless the user 
enterprise promises to ensure that placed employees shall have terms and 
conditions of employment that are not less favourable than those applicable to 
the user‟s incumbent employees performing the same or similar work of equal 
value. 
d) Prohibition against placing employees with a user company during or in 
contemplation of a strike or lockout or within 6 months after retrenchment of 
employees. 
e) Similar to the Labour Amendment Act, criminal penalties to a maximum fine 
$20,000 or two years imprisonment or both will be imposed for violations of 
above requirements. 
 
6.4.3 Another Court Challenge in Namibia (2012) 
 
Following the implementation of the new Labour Amendment Act and part 4 of the 
Employment Services Act on 1 August 2012 and 1 September 2012 respectively, to replace 
the previous unconstitutional s128 of Labour Act 2007, African Personnel Services (APS) 
initiated another court case to challenge the legality of the two new laws. 
 
APS insists that the new s128 of the law effectively bans labour brokers. The Minister of 
Labour Immanuel Ngatjizeko argues that the amendment to the Labour Act is merely 
regulating labour brokers, and is aimed at the relationship between companies making use 
of employees from labour-broking companies and the people made available to the user 
companies. According to APS, the change in the law has already had a major damaging 
effect on its operations, with a several client companies having cancelled their agreements 
with APS and its work force having shrunk from more than 1600 people before the 
amendment come into force about 319 people at this stage.  
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Judges Liebenberg and Geier heard arguments from senior counsel Frank, who was 
representing Africa Labour Services, and senior counsel MChaskalson, representing 
Government and the Minister of Labour and Social Welfare, in the High Court in Windhoek 
on 27 September 2012. In his argument before court, Frank stated that „it appears that it is 
only Ngatjizeko, who is disputing that s128 would in effect get rid of labour-brokers 
altogether‟ 232 . Frank argued on that score, the trade unions, the Namibian Employers 
Federation and the Labour Commissioner are in agreement that the amendment of the Act 
will put the labour hire companies in Namibia out of the business, he argued. APS conceding 
that government may regulate business. However, section 128 goes much further than 
merely regulating labour hire, would have the same result as the outright ban which the 
supreme court found unconstitutional, he argued. 
  
„They want to ban labour broking in effect,‟ Frank said. The change in the Labour Act would 
represent the material barrier to APS doing its business, he added, if the court agree with 
that view, it would have to find that s128 is unconstitutional, he concluded.  
 
Chaskalson on the other hand, argued that APS has not shown that its fundamental rights 
were being limited by the new section of the Labour Act. If the court were to find that the 
company‟s right were limited, though, that is a justifiable limitation he argued. Chaskalson 
argued that „s128 does not infringe on APS‟s constitutional right to carry on its a chosen 
trade or business‟233. What that part of the law does, he argued, is to close a loophole with 
APS used to exploit for its own commercial benefit. He said s128 does not ban or even aim 
to regulate labour brokers. What it does; 
 
 „is to regulate the relationship between labour broker company employees and the 
company that using their labour. At worst for a labour broking company s128 could 
have the effect of persuading companies which have been using the service of labour 
brokers, to no longer use of their services, because that would no longer help them to 
circumvent the Labour Act.‟234 he concluded. 
 
The case was expected to continue in 2013, but for now both amendment Acts to s128 are 
currently in operation as of the stipulated dates of effect until the court rules otherwise when 
the second challenge case is concluded in the High Court and maybe even the Supreme 
Court of Appeal. For now, all employees‟ operating under the three party employment 
relationship are enjoying the same and more improved conditions of employment and labour 
law protection.   
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CHAPTER 7 
 
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
7.1 Introduction   
 
This chapter make useful recommendations for lawmakers and the governments of South 
Africa and Namibia to consider in their ongoing efforts to introduce amendments to their 
existing labour laws. It highlights some of the key points to note, that are discussed in the 
thesis that can greatly influence how we look at labour broking services and the expected 
future development of this industry under labour law reforms.  If both South Africa and 
Namibia can have a clear understanding of the recommendations and conclusions 
discussed in this chapter, both countries will successfully be able to fully establish 
frameworks to protect the rights of workers under labour broking. The same frameworks 
could also help serve the employers‟ interests to engage flexible employment strategies that 
enable them to compete globally, and to ensure continuous economic growths and job 
opportunities for the highly unemployed populations of both countries. 
 
 
7.2 Conclusions 
 
Labour brokers are businesses setup to supply “flexible” labour services, mostly of unskilled 
and semi-skilled employees, to client companies. The labour brokers enter into employment 
relationships as third parties with client companies to supply employees through a 
commercial contract. These labour services are usually outside the regular two-party 
contract of employment defined under existing labour laws, and thus many of these 
employees are not covered by labour laws. The labour brokers normally advertise their 
operations as a service that allows client companies to concentrate on their “core business”. 
The growth of such arrangements between labour brokers and their clients confirmed the 
increasing trend to outsource labour services for “flexibility”. However, what has been 
alarming is that this industry has increasingly been by-passing labour laws and all the 
standards of work stipulated by the ILO. Thus, amendments to current labour laws in South 
Africa and Namibia is urgently needed to bring the individuals rendering labour services in 
triangular relationships within the definition of an employee. These will extent the protection 
provided by labour laws to labour broking employees without limiting the capacity of local 
business to compete globally.  
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Since the emergence of post-apartheid South Africa and Namibia under new democratic 
laws and legislations, labour broking operations have spread extensively in the labour 
markets and penetrated most industrial sectors to employ large numbers of the most illiterate 
and unskilled class groups, as globalisation continues to be a major driving force in modern 
business practice.  However, what has been more alarming is that the emergence of labour 
brokers has, worryingly, converted permanent jobs into insecure jobs with lower wages and 
fewer benefits, because  some “selfish” businesses look to take the easy way out of their 
social responsibilities. The majority of companies in Namibia and South Africa who  engage 
labour brokers often point to the ever decreasing margins of profitability in the  new global 
economy of “borderless” trade where even a company on  another continent is a potential 
competitor for local market domination. Most companies highlight reasons such as cutting of 
costs, while others aim to achieve greater flexibility or to avoid trade unions, labour strikes 
and, more worryingly, the provisions of the Labour Acts.  
 
Clients of labour brokers would normally request a certain number of workers for a certain 
period from the labour company and pay an agreed hourly fee to the labour brokers for the 
activities performed by those workers. Then the employee‟s original labour remuneration, the 
broker then deducts a percentage as commission, as they see fit. As a result, on most 
occasions labour broker employees do not receive the same pay and benefits as those 
received by permanent workers in the same job. They are left to survive on poverty wages 
which does not help to improve the huge inequality that exists between the social classes.   
Thus, a regulatory framework could help in setting a maximum deductable commission by a 
labour broker and leave the employees in a much better position to improve their standard of 
living. In addition, a regulation measure should be placed in the Employment Equity Acts, 
and make it clear that that same-value of work should be compensated by the same pay, 
regardless on the duration of the employment relationship.  
 
Furthermore, research findings have also highlighted that labour broking employment 
contracts usually only subsist for as long as the period of the labour commercial contract 
between the brokers and their client companies.   Although they could be deployed on a full-
time basis and may work for the same client company for years, labour broking workers are 
denied job security, as those deemed unsuitable are instantly and easily replaced. Some 
employees are replaced for taking maternity leave or the prescribed annual leave days. 
These terminations at most times are unlawful in substance and procedure, but the clients 
who often call for such replacements are not legally liable as the definition of  „employee‟ 
does not recognise them as employers; only the brokers. That is why, more often than not, 
the employees are dismissed unfairly without any procedures of retrenchment, and without 
severance payouts, and are just kept at home without any paid leave. The CCMA case of 
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Molusi and Ngisiza Bonke Manpower Services CC highlighted that similar liability between 
employers and labour brokers remains elusive and that judgements concerning unfair 
dismissals are dependent upon the facts of each case. In this case the appellant, who had 
taken maternity leave shortly after she was placed with a client company, was replaced 
(dismissed) as per request of the client.   However, this „replacement‟ clearly warranted an 
unfair dismissal case as the Labour Acts make provision for female employees to be given 
maternity leave. Thus, given these unlawful conditions of labour broking and the negative 
impacts on workers rights, it is understandable that many trade unions make strong calls for 
a ban on labour brokers. However, a reading of both international and national labour trends 
would suggest a more measured response. If the current definitions of an „employee‟ are 
amended to include triangular employment relationships, the workers recruited through 
labour brokers will be better able to seek the prosecution of, and damages from, both the 
labour brokers and the clients for committed unfair dismissals, such as, those related to 
maternity leave, severance pay or terminations without appropriate notice periods.   
 
There are clearly gaps in the definitions and responsibilities of clients and individuals 
rendering labour services in the labour broking sectors, but given the new and changing 
nature of employment in the new global economy, current labour laws must fully extend to 
those workers in these relationships. Thus, as initiated in both countries with the proposed 
regulation draft Bills; current employment developments necessitate a review of key labour 
relations legislation to ensure clarity in respect of the definition of an „employee‟. The 
decisions in court cases have led the way in providing clarity on the level of involvement of a 
client in the employment relationship.  
 
In view of the current absence of clear definitions or regulations, all experience shows that 
labour brokers are effectively able to ignore existing labour legislation provisions. Thus, the 
proposed laws should provide for a specific framework within which a labour broker can be 
registered. This would compel those that seek to be licensed to pass labour law training 
requirements to ensure that their conduct adheres to current labour standards. The 
continued operation of labour brokers without any proper definition, registration or licensing 
process, makes the control of their activities difficult, and allows them to act outside the 
current labour frameworks. This situation also makes monitoring and enforcement difficult for 
state labour agencies and inspectorates.  
 
The biggest resistance around the current operations of labour brokers in South Africa and 
Namibia has come from union movements. Trade unions in both countries have argued that 
labour brokers do nothing but erode employment conditions by making use of old apartheid 
type contract labour recruitment. They have sent repeated calls to national lawmakers to 
 
 
 
 
72 
 
amend existing labour legislation and totally ban all forms of labour brokers. Research has 
found that some unions refuse to provide membership to employees of labour brokers as 
they believe that in doing so they will be approving this new form of “modern slavery”. Others 
have found it rather difficult to categorise and organise labour broking workers because the 
“flexible” nature of workers‟ jobs means that they are often moved between a number of 
client companies in different industries, or run out of all contracts and face long spells at 
home. In addition, they are limited in their demands for decent working conditions because 
most labour broking employees are excluded from most collective bargaining agreements 
and trade union representation as the temporary nature of their employment is perceived as 
making it difficult to organise them.   
 
Politically it would seem like a very popular decision to ban labour brokers altogether in an 
effort to promote “morality and decency” in conditions of employment, as was initiated under 
section 128 of the Namibian Labour Act of 2007. However, there are legal obstacles and 
several arguments against banning labour brokering. The Supreme Court of Appeal in 
Namibia during 2007 ruled that a total ban will not necessarily solve the exploitation and 
concerns of workers. It pointed out that there are many forms of non-standard employment 
in the new global economy and most labour brokers will merely find other ways to operate 
illegally within the country, as independent contractors or as specialised outsourcing 
services similar to cleaning and security services.  This will continue the same insecure and 
exploitive conditions for those workers since most labour brokers are aware that 
independent contractors are not covered under the Labour Acts.  
 
Outlawing labour brokers would also have to address several constitutional challenges that 
were expressed by the SCA in Namibia in the African Personnel Services case. This court 
held that banning labour brokers limited the applicant‟s fundamental „freedom to carry on a 
trade or a business of choice‟ under Art 21 (1) (j) in the Namibian Constitution. The court 
held that the prohibition imposes restrictions on commercial activities protected by the 
Constitution which are grossly unreasonable. The court further held that, if agency work is 
properly regulated within the ambit of the Constitution and as prescribed by ILO Convention 
181 of 1997, it would pose no threat to standard employment relationships or unionisation 
and contribute to flexibility in the economy. The court then concluded that the prohibition of 
economic activity is so overbroad that it is not reasonable and should be struck down as 
unconstitutional. 
 
Subsequently, some three years after the landmark SCA ruling, at the time of writing this 
thesis, the Namibian government reversed the earlier attempt to ban labour brokers under 
s128. The government on 03 November 2011 introduced draft proposals to regulate the 
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operations of labour brokers in Namibia, a response to the SCA judgement in the African 
Personnel Services case which ruled that it was unconstitutional to prohibit labour broking 
companies on their right to engage in any business, trade or profession of choice. When the 
Minister of Labour and Social Services, Hon. Immanuel Ngatjizeko, tabled the Labour Act 
Amendment Bill of 2011, he highlighted that the new law will, amongst others, make client 
companies equally liable for employment conditions and unlawful practices.  
 
South Africa has paid close attention to developments in neighbouring Namibia, as leading 
labour law academics believe that any attempts by the amendment laws proposed by the 
South African Department of Labour in 2010 to ban labour brokers will face a constitutional 
challenge similar to that in Namibia.  
 
But as one academic pointed out, there is no doubt that labour broking is not the only 
exploitative practice and that it is difficult to secure decent working conditions in free market 
economy underpinned by structural mass unemployment. However he said that, leaving 
workers to the mercy of „market forces‟ and arguing that regulations to protect them will lead 
to further unemployment does not only ignore the plight of vulnerable workers but also locks 
them into a poverty trap without a chance of working their way out of poverty. He adds that, 
workers‟ rights have to be defended as universal human rights and thus, exploitative 
practices have to be fought wherever they occur. What is required now are a host of 
developmental interventions to create decent work which will allow workers to meet their 
basic needs and in the process, create local demand for basic consumer goods.  Eventually, 
improved employment conditions will not only improve workers‟ lives but also create a better 
economic base for local production. Thus, the government of the South Africa, as was done 
in 2012 by Namibia, is trying to pass labour amendment laws in favour of regulatory 
frameworks that will better protect workers without limiting the employers‟ need for flexibility 
in a new global market context. 
 
7.3 Recommendations 
 
Regardless of the regulation measures that can be proposed to have in operation in the next 
few years, the rights of labour broking workers in South Africa and Namibia will only be fully 
protected and guaranteed if the Department of Labour and Ministry of Labour, respectively, 
play a hands-on role in regulating and monitoring the activities of labour brokers and their 
relationships with workers.   
 
As a start, the South African and Namibian governments should ensure sufficient allocation 
of funding and personnel to conduct regular on-site inspections of labour brokers and their 
clients. Otherwise, if there are not enough inspectors to go around, the regulatory framework 
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for labour brokers will still be weakened and severely undermined.  The inspectors should 
often speak directly to workers to get a perspective as to whether both labour brokers and 
clients are complying with regulatory provisions, and those falling short should be penalised 
or have their licences withdrawn. Both governments should also ensure that other law 
enforcement bodies, such as, public prosecutor, ombudsman, legal courts, and even the 
police; have the capacity to deal with transgressors of, and non-compliance with, the 
regulatory framework. The existing offices of the Ombudsman and the Public Protector in 
Namibia and South Africa, respectively, should also be strengthened to ensure an 
accountability auditing process on deliberate gaps and oversight by the labour agencies and 
inspectors. 
 
In addition, from the discussions in the thesis, it is clear that labour broking employees 
experience greater violations of their rights as a result of a lack of representation and 
protection under collective agreements. For this reason, trade unions in South Africa and 
Namibia should become more pro-active and develop strategies to organise labour broking 
workers more effectively. A bargaining council for temporary workers needs to be explored 
once labour brokers are legally registered. In addition, the unions should also regularly 
facilitate training and education programmes for these workers to inform them about their 
labour rights, socio-economic rights, and the standards of decent work promoted by ILO 
conventions. More significantly, the unions should always try to involve the labour broking 
businesses in their training programmes as these stakeholders will only be able to get the 
best out of their workers if they are able to fully understand their needs and concerns, which 
can bring about a better product for the client companies with which they are contracted. 
 
The regulation framework should include a provision that addresses equality and parity 
among different categories of workers to prevent any exploitable differentials in pay and 
conditions between standard employees and labour broking workers doing the same work 
for the same company.  
 
Going forward, it is clear that due to the high levels of unemployment throughout South 
Africa and Namibia, the practices of non-standard employment, such as, labour broking are 
not going to disappear as the population grows rapidly, and more and more become 
desperate for employment. Thus, it is crucial that the proposed draft regulation alws in both 
countries are passed and implemented to ensure that the activities of labour brokers are 
effectively registered and regulated, and that their employees are paid the minimum wage, 
registered for social security, and workmen‟s compensation, and receive other basic 
employment benefits. These proposed labour laws and labour systems in South Africa and 
Namibia should thus take full account of the three-tiered employment relationship by putting 
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the necessary legislative mechanisms in place which will ensure and enforce responsibility 
for compliance by both brokers and clients jointly. Similarly, trade unions should take leaps 
and bounds in terms of ensuring the mobilisation and unionisation of labour broking workers. 
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